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I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal efforts to regulate signs and billboards have typically
presented two competing concerns to local governments. First are the
perceived interests supporting regulation, most notably traffic safety
and aesthetics.1 Municipal efforts at preserving and enhancing a
pleasing urban environment have become particularly important in
recent years, with aesthetically based regulations becoming a major
component of local land use controls. Courts have also increasingly
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; B.S., Portland State
University; J.D., Willamette University; J.S.M., Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1052 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821
F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988).
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state interest
accepted aesthetics as both a legitimate and substantial
capable of supporting various land use regulations. 2
Competing with the traffic safety and aesthetic concerns posed by
signs and billboards are their communicative value. Not only are they
a form of first amendment expression deserving of accommodation but
at times serve particularly important communicative needs. Local
governments might therefore determine that in some instances the
communicative
values outweigh the competing aesthetic and traffic
3
concerns.
For these reasons municipalities typically regulate signs and billboards in a selective fashion, seeking to accommodate communicative
and First Amendment needs while furthering aesthetic and traffic
safety concerns. Although this might only involve basic restrictions on
size, design, and placement, 4 in many instances municipalities pursue
broader restrictions which prohibit some signs while permitting
others. Such a selective approach might be structured in a contentneutral fashion by limiting the type or number of signs. 5 A municipality might attempt to regulate signage further by reference to content,
such as distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial
speech 6 or establish exemptions within the above categories. 7
2. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1980); City of Champaign v. Koger Co., 410
N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). For a general discussion of judicial acceptance of
aesthetics as within the police power, see Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Aesthetic Controls and Derivative Human Values: The Emerging Rational Basis for Regulation, in 1986 ZONING AND PLANNING LAw HANDBOOK 239 (J. Benjamin Galley ed.,
1986); Ronald K. Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics,
tlze FirstAmendment and the Realitiesof BillboardControl, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295,
300-15 (1981).
3. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). See also
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984)(finding aesthetic interest in eliminating signs was not compromised by failing to extend ban to private property).
4. See, e.g., Corey Outdoor Advertising v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 327 S.E.2d
178 (Ga. 1985)(signs prohibited within 300 feet of historic site); City of Albuquerque v. Jackson, 684 P.2d 543 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)(26 foot height limit on signs).
5. See, e.g., Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir.
1987)(imiting portable signs); Harnish v. Manatee County, 783 F.2d 1535 (11th
Cir. 1986)(banning portable signs); Signs, Inc. v. Orange County, 592 F. Supp.
693 (M.D. Fla. 1983)(banning portable signs); Risher v. City of Wyoming, 383
N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)(limiting number of days that temporary signs
may be displayed).
6. See, e.g., Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormand Beach, 415 So.
2d 1312 (FIM.Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(giving a commercial/non-commercial distinction); Maurice Callahan & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 427 N.E.2d 25 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1981)(basing decision on a commercial/non-commercial distinction).
7. See, e.g., Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446
(E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102
(1987)(giving on site exemption and "for sale" sign exemption); National Advertising Co. v. City of Bridgeton, 626 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1985)(exempting political
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The Supreme Court has addressed sign and billboard regulation on
four occasions in the last 17 years, most recently last term in City of
Ladue v. Gilleo.8 In that case the Court summarized its prior decisions by stating that a sign regulation might be constitutionally invalid in two separate ways. First, a regulation may be unconstitutional
when an ordinance restricts "too little" speech by creating exemptions
which violate content-neutrality. 9 Conversely, an ordinance might be
unconstitutional by restricting "too much" speech and thereby unnecessarily limiting expressive activities.1 0 The Court proceeded to strike
down the ordinance in Ladue on the latter ground, holding that an
ordinance which prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on
their property with the exception of homeowner identification signs,
"for sale" signs, and safety signs, infringed on an important form of
communication.1"
The two potential problems in sign regulation identified by the
Court in Ladue-either restricting too little or too much speech-correspond to two fundamental themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. First is the requirement of content-neutrality, which is
potentially violated when a sign ordinance exempts certain contentrelated signs and thus restricts "too little" speech.12 Although the parameters of this requirement are far from clear, it has in recent years
become the Supreme Court's dominant analytical tool.1s

On the other hand, the problem of restricting speech "too much"
recognizes the critical First Amendment concern that governmental
regulation should not significantly restrict speech opportunities.
Although speech is subject to reasonable regulations, such as regarding the time, place, or manner of expression,14 the state cannot significantly diminish speech opportunities.' 5 This concern refers not only
to the potential for regulation to reduce the total quantity of speech

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

signs); Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982)(listing eight
exemptions); Gannet Outdoor Co. v. City of Troy, 401 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986)(discussing political sign exemption).
114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
Id. at 2043-44.
Id. at 2043.
Id. at 2044-46.
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,455-71 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
See Susan H. Williams, ContentDiscriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 615, 616-17 (1991).
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981). See generally
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 57-71
(1987).
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opportunities, but also its potential to restrict uniquely significant
speech fora.16
Each of these two First Amendment interests place limits upon
and pose potential problems for municipal efforts to pursue their aesthetic and traffic safety concerns through sign and billboard regulation. There are, of course, certain selective controls that
municipalities can pursue which further aesthetic concerns while providing speech opportunities, such as restrictions on size, location, and
placement of signs.17 In most instances these would not raise either of
the above First Amendment concerns, but they are limited in the aesthetic objectives they could serve. More extensive attempts at sign
control often put municipalities in a dilemma, however, because certain exemptions are often desirable or even necessary, but potentially
violate content-neutrality. In such situations the municipality is often
faced with a choice of either permitting all signs, and thereby impede
its interests, or banning all signs in a particular context. Not only
does this latter choice undercut First Amendment concerns, but in
some instances it might be constitutionally problematic by prohibiting
"too much speech."
Although recognizing the above two concerns, the Supreme Court
has given only limited guidance in steering a course between them.
Most problematic in this regard is the Court's decision in Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,18 where it addressed the constitutionality of
a comprehensive billboard and sign ordinance. Although a majority of
the Court found the particular restrictions valid as applied to commercial speech, it found the ordinance invalid as applied to non-commercial speech, without agreeing on a rationale. The decision produced
five separate opinions, with only a portion of one opinion gaining a
majority of the Court, resulting in few definitive principles. Similarly,
the Court has provided significantly different degrees of concern for
suppressive sign regulations, especially when comparing Ladue with
its prior decision in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent.19
In recent years there have been a large number of state and federal
decisions attempting to sort out the parameters of permissible regula16. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49 (1943); Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).

17. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 333 (Il1. 1991), cert. denied, 501

U.S. 1261 (1991); City of Albuquerque v. Jackson, 684 P.2d 543 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984)(giving 26 foot height limit on signs).
18. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
19. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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tion.20 This significant amount of litigation is due not only to the uncertainty surrounding Supreme Court decisions, but also because of
the numerous regulatory approaches a municipality might use to balance the communicative and aesthetic concerns inevitably involved in
billboard and sign regulation. In seeking to apply the limited principles of Metromedia and other cases to a vast array of possible regulations, courts have often reached conflicting results on similar issues.
This is true regarding certain types of content-neutral restrictions 2 '
22
and particularly any content-related regulation.
This Article will examine the evolving law of sign and billboard
regulations, with particular attention to the dual concerns noted by
the Court in Ladue of restricting "too much" speech and restricting
"too little." It will address three general issues surrounding the permissible limits of sign and billboard regulation. The Article will begin
by addressing Ladue's concern regarding regulations that restrict
speech too much. In particular, it will examine the extent to which a
municipality must accommodate signs or billboards.
20. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3rd Cir. 1994); Arlington
County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993);
Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2395 (1993); National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 703 F. Supp. 228
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart,900 F.2d 551 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 852 (1990); Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 819 P.2d 44
(Ariz. 1991); City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52 (Colo.
1981). See also R. Douglas Bond, Note, Making Sense of BillboardLaw: Justifying Prohibitionsand Exemptions, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2482 (1990)(discussing some
of the inconsistent results in lower court decisions after Metromedia); Brad Sanders, Note, The FirstAmendment "Law of Billboards," 30 WASH. U. J. URB. AND
CONTEMP. L., 333, 353-61 (1986)(discussing confusion of post Metromedia cases).
21. Courts have split regarding the validity of separate restrictions on portable or
temporary signs. For cases holding separate restrictions invalid, see Dills v.
Cobb County, 755 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1985); Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d
1377 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983); All American Sign Rentals, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 592 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Signs, Inc. v. Orange
County, 592 F. Supp. 693 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F.
Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Risner v. City of Wyoming, 383 N.W.2d 276 (1985). For
cases holding separate restrictions on portable signs valid, see Messer v. City of
Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2395 (1993);
Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Harnish v. Manatee County, 783
F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1986); Mobile Sign, Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 670 F. Supp.
68 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Barber v. Municipality of Anchorage, 776 P.2d 1035 (Alaska
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989).
22. Compare, e.g., Revere Nat'l Corp. v. Prince George's County, 819 F. Supp. 1336
(D. Md. 1993)(finding content exemptions invalid) and Burkhart Advertising, Inc.
v. City of Auburn, 786 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ind. 1991)(finding content distinctions
invalid) with Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994)(finding
limited content exemptions valid).
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A second area of concern is the permissible limit of content-neutral
yet underinclusive restrictions on signs and billboards. Although the
Court has clearly recognized a municipality's right to place reasonable
restrictions on sign and billboard use, the First Amendment implications of the activity requires some heightened scrutiny. In particular,
lower courts have evenly split regarding the validity of prohibitions or
special restrictions on portable or temporary signs. 2 3 Those decisions
invalidating such restrictions have generally focused on the underinclusive nature of the restriction.
The third and final area of examination is the extent to which municipalities can create content-based distinctions in regulation.
Although a majority of the Court in Metromedia upheld a broad form
of content-regulation applied to commercial speech, the legitimacy of
other content-based distinctions is less certain. On one level are possible content distinctions between commercial and non-commercial
speech, which are a common component of sign ordinances but have
been brought into question by the Court's recent decision in City of
Cincinnativ. Discovery Network, Inc.24 More problematic are contentbased distinctions as applied to non-commercial speech. Although the
Court has generally prohibited content-based distinctions in such situations, a close reading of the opinions in Metromediaindicate that five
justices would allow distinctions under varying circumstances.
Part II of the Article will first examine the First Amendment
framework, focusing on time, place, and manner regulations of speech
and the commercial speech doctrine. Part III will then examine the
decisions in which the Supreme Court has addressed restrictions on
signs: Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,2 5 Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,26 Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent,2 7 and City ofLadue v. Gilleo,28 synthesizing the Court's current approach to sign and billboard regulation. Parts IV, V, and VI
will then address the issues discussed above.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
A. Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
The Supreme Court has frequently recognized that reasonable restrictions may be placed on First Amendment conduct in order to further important non-speech interests. 2 9 Whereas the Court has
23.
24.
25.
26.

See supra note 21.
113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
453 U.S. 490 (1981).

27. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
28. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
29. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-93 (1989); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:36

typically scrutinized restrictions intended to suppress a particular
message,3 0 it has consistently stated that the state may regulate expression to promote nonspeech interests. In particular, the Court has
noted that the state may regulate the time, manner, or place of expression to further important interests.3 1 The general validity of such
restrictions is premised on the idea that the state is not attempting to
suppress speech, but instead is simply regulating where and when it
32
will occur so as to avoid interference with other state interests.
Despite the Court's general willingness to permit such restrictions,
it has articulated several requirements to ensure that the restrictions
properly accommodate First Amendment interests. In recent years
the Court's primary requirement has been that regulation of First
Amendment activity be content-neutral.ss This concern was initially
reflected in the early public forum cases where the Court struck down
discretionary licensing schemes because of the possibility of viewpoint
discrimination.34 In more recent years the Court has extended the
prohibition to any content-based regulation, stating that "government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its contentP.35 As a consequence, the Court has
held that regardless of whether the state is required to accommodate
speech in a particular place or time, once it has opened a particular
forum to some speech it cannot exclude other speech contents.3 6
Despite the general concern about content-neutrality, the Court
has on occasion permitted content-based distinctions in relation to
subject-matter. Although the Court has not clearly articulated the circumstances in which this is allowed, it is arguably justified where distinct secondary effects are generated by particular content. For
example, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,Inc.,37 the Court held
30. See, e.g., RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See generally MELVILLE
B. NhMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.06 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
34. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovel v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
35. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)(citation omitted).
36. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Court held invalid a
university's decision to prohibit student religious meetings on campus while permitting a number of other groups to meet. Although the Court noted that the

university was not necessarily required to allow any group to meet, once it allowed some groups it could not selectively exclude others. Id. at 277.
37. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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that the state could single-out adult theaters for more restrictive
treatment because they were found to generate distinct, noncommunicative secondary effects.38 The Court has similarly permitted subjectmatter distinctions in other limited contexts in which particular
problems were posed, at times noting captive 4audience concerns 39 or
the non-public nature of the regulated forum. 0
Assuming the content-neutrality of the regulation, the Court has
generally articulated an intermediate standard of review of restrictions on First Amendment conduct. The Court has articulated this
standard in various ways, but in recent years has stated that restrictions must serve a substantial or significant interest in a narrowly
tailored manner and leave adequate alternatives for communication.4 1 Although this rule suggests the application of heightened scrutiny for any restriction on speech, in practice the Court has upheld
most restrictions as long as they do not pose a significant threat to
effective communication. 4 2 In such instances the Court has recognized any asserted interest to be substantial.43 Similarly, the Court
has not closely scrutinized the precision of regulation, suggesting that
the state need not pursue alternatives which would be less effective.44
On the other hand, the Court has closely scrutinized decisions
which, though content-neutral, operate to significantly suppress
speech.45 For example, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim4 6 the
Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited all live entertainment-a form of expression. Emphasizing that the ordinance banned
a form of expression and thus significantly suppressed speech oppor47
tunities, the Court said it would need to scrutinize the restriction.
38. Id. at 48-49. See also R-.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992)(discussing "secondary effects" test).
39. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)(upholding ordinance
which allowed commercial but prohibited political advertising on public
transportation).
40. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)(banning speeches and demonstrations on
a military base).
41. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984); Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-49
(1981).
42. See generally William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the
Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and MannerRegulations ofExpression, 54 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 757, 782-92 (1986); Stone, supra note 15, at 50-54.
43. Stone, supra note 15, at 51.
44. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
45. Dean Stone has identified this as the central concern in the Court's treatment of
content-neutral regulations. See Stone, supra note 15, at 57-71. See also LAuhENCE H. ThIBE, A~mRICAN CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-23 (2nd ed. 1988)(stating
that even a content-neutral restriction is "invalid if it leaves too little breathing
space for communicative activity").
46. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
47. Id. at 71.
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In other instances the Court has invalidated content-neutral restrictions which suppressed particularly significant media of
communication. 4 8
Importantly, the Court may stress the unique or significant role
that a particular forum or medium plays in effective communication.
Although the Court has emphasized that the First Amendment does
not guarantee the best or most effective means of communication for a
particular speaker, 49 it has shown special solicitude for forms of expression that have been viewed as traditionally necessary for adequate expression, especially for the common person.5 0 Because of the
constitutional significance of such activities, the Court has required
that the state pursue less intrusive restrictions rather than cpmplete
bans.51
The Court's time, place, and manner analysis has been primarily
developed in cases involving various forms of fully protected speech.
The regulation of signs and billboards frequently impact both commercial and non-commercial speech, however. The next subsection of this
Article will therefore briefly examine commercial speech doctrine.
B. Commercial Speech
Although the early cases did not include commercial speech within
the ambit of the First Amendment,52 the Court extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech in a series of decisions
beginning in the mid-1970s. This approach was first suggested in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,53 in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting
the advertisement of prescription drug prices. The Court specifically
rejected the position that commercial speech is outside the First
Amendment, recognizing that such speech served an important func48. See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)(discussing ban on door-to-door
distribution of literature); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939)(discussing ban on leafletting).
49. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
(1984).
50. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)(discussing handbills on public streets);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)(discussing door-to-door distribution of literature); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)(plurality opinion)(discussing free speech in streets and parks); Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 413 (1939)(discussing handbills on streets).
51. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
52. The nonprotected nature of commercial speech was first established in Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where the Court held that "the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54.
53. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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tion in disseminating information.54 Subsequent decisions have affirmed the First Amendment status of commercial speech, applying
heightened scrutiny to restrictions on a variety of types of commercial
speech including lawyer advertising,55 contraceptive advertising,56
"for sale" signs, 57 and trade names.5 8
Although the Supreme Court in these decisions extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech, the Court made clear
that commercial speech does not enjoy the same degree of protection
as non-commercial speech for several reasons. 59 First, the Court has
noted that commercial speech is less likely to be chilled by regulation
than other forms of speech because of economic incentives. 6 0 The
Court has also suggested that commercial speech is less central to the
primary interests of the First Amendment6l and has expressed concern that conferring equal status on commercial speech will erode protection for non-commercial speech.62
The precise scope of the limited protection afforded commercial
speech remains somewhat obscure. The Court has stated that like
other types of expression, commercial speech may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.63 In noting this, the
Court has several times suggested that it will employ a standard comparable to other time, place, and manner restrictions to commercial
speech, stating any such regulations must serve significant state interests, and "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."64
The primary focus of the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
has been the validity of restrictions aimed at particular commercial
54. Id. at 771.
55. The Court first addressed the issue of lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), in which it struck down state limitations on attorney advertising. See also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985)(allowing attorney to solicit business through advertising); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982)(forbidding misleading attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)(limiting attorney's solicitation of business
only when used to bait an agreement of representation); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978)(protecting legal solicitation by nonprofit organizations).
56. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
57. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
58. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Posados de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
60. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
61. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5
(1985)(Powell, J.).
62. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
63. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1980)(citation omitted); Virginia State Bd.
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976)(citation omitted).
64. Id.
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messages. The current test employed by the Court in evaluating such
restrictions was articulated in CentralHudson Gas & ElectricCorp. v.
PublicService Commission.65 The Court stated synthesized principles
from other commercial speech cases and stated a four-part test:
At the outset we must determine whether the expression is protected by the

First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at

least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more exten66
sive than is necessary to serve that interest.

This test suggests that the Court will apply a form of heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, for restrictions on commercial speech
content. As a practical matter, generally the Court has more closely
scrutinized restrictions on basic informational messages. When the
informational element dissipates, scrutiny is relaxed. 6 7
Although the Court clearly extends lesser protection to commercial
than non-commercial speech, whether this can be a valid basis for distinguishing between the two in the same regulatory scheme is unclear. As will be discussed in the next section, a majority of the Court
in Metromedia permitted greater restrictions on commercial than noncommercial speech because of the lower protection afforded the former. Such a distinction was recently brought into question in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,6s however, where the Court
held that a city could not use the lower protection afforded commercial
speech as a basis to ban commercial newsracks while permitting noncommercial ones.6 9 The decision in Discovery and its impact on sign
regulation will be discussed more fully in Part VI of this Article.
The next section of this Article will more closely examine the
Supreme Court's application of these basic First Amendment principles in the context of sign and billboard regulation. It will examine
the Supreme Court's four principal decisions concerning restrictions
on signs and billboards: Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, and City of Ladue v. Gilleo.

65. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
66. Id. at 566.
67. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1980);
TREATISE ON CONSTrTIONAL LAw § 20.31 (1986).
68. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
69. Id. at 1516.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro
The Supreme Court first reviewed a restriction on signs in
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro.70 In that case the

township of Willingboro had passed an ordinance prohibiting "for sale"

signs for the purpose of stopping "white flight" and panic selling.71

The municipality sought to justify the restriction because the ordinance only regulated one form of expression and because of the city's
interest in racial integration.
The Court first addressed the town's assertion that the First
Amendment concerns were less significant in this case because the ordinance only restricted one particular manner of communication and
therefore did not amount to a complete ban.72 The Court acknowledged that it had recognized a significant difference between time,
place, and manner regulations and complete bans,73 but rejected the
time, place, and manner argument in this case for two reasons. First,
the Court questioned whether a ban on "for sale" signs left adequate
alternatives for the sale of homes. The Court said that the only two
realistic alternatives to signs-newspaper advertisements and real
estate agents-involved less autonomy and more expense and therefore might not be considered adequate alternatives to the use of "for
sale" signs. 74
Second, the Court also said the ordinance could not be considered a
permissible time, place, or manner restriction because it only restricted "for sale" signs and was therefore not content-neutral.75 The
aesthetic and traffic concerns which might otherwise justify regulation of signs could not justify this restriction because the ordinance
did not regulate other signs which generated comparable concerns.
Thus, the regulation was aimed not at the particular form or manner
of expression, but its content, and could only be justified as such. 76
Viewing the regulation as content-based, the Court rejected the restriction for two reasons. First, the Court said that the city failed to
show that the ban was necessary to further its interest in racial integration. 7 7 Second, and more importantly, the Court said the primary
flaw in the ordinance was that it restricted the free flow of information
70.
71.
72.
73.

431 U.S. 85 (1977).
Id. at 87-89.
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 93.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 93-94.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 95-96.
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that was neither false nor misleading. Since such information played
an important role in vital decisions, it should not be restricted.7 8
Although Linmark involved a restriction on only one type of commercial sign, it is significant because of its treatment of the time,
place, and manner analysis. The Court's refusal to characterize the
restriction as a permissible time, place, and manner regulation because of the ordinance's content classification reflects the Court's emphasis on content-neutrality and equal access. To the extent that a
restriction is based on the typical secondary effects of aesthetics and
traffic, the regulation must extend to other signs with comparable
concerns.
The Court's suggestion that higher scrutiny might also be required
because of a lack of adequate alternatives is somewhat more interesting. In stating that the two realistic alternatives available-newspapers and real estate agents-were unsatisfactory, the Court explained
that they involved more cost, provided less autonomy, and may be less
effective. 79 Although the Court did not clearly articulate how these
factors should be weighed, it suggests some scrutiny of the effectiveness of alternatives. To some extent the inadequacy of alternatives
might be explained by the unique association of the sign to the location: the sign communicated something about the property on which
it was located. Indeed, in stating that alternatives were less effective,
the Court said that alternatives "may be less effective media for communicating the message that is conveyed by a 'For Sale' sign in front
of the house to be sold. . . ."8o

B. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
Four years after Linmark, the Supreme Court addressed a more
broad-based regulation of billboards and signs in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego.81 The San Diego billboard ordinance reviewed in
Metromedia prohibited the display of outdoor signs, which was interpreted by the California Supreme Court to apply only to permanent
sign structures.8 2 The ordinance provided for two broad exceptions,
however. First, it permitted on-site signs, which were defined as those
designating the name of the owner or identifying goods produced or
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 93.
Id.
453 U.S. 490 (1981). For commentary on Metromedia, see Aronovsky, supra note
2; Theodore V. Blumoff, After Metromedia: Sign Controlsand the FirstAmendment, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 171 (1983); Bond, supra note 20; Sanders, supra note
20.
82. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 494-95 (1981)(plurality
opinion).
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services rendered on the premises.8 3 Second, the ordinance provided
for twelve exempted categories of signs, including government signs,
historical plaques, religious symbols, "for sale" signs, and temporary
political signs. 8 4 The stated purpose of the ordinance was "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distracting sign displays" and "to preserve and improve the appearance of the
city."85
The Supreme Court produced five separate opinions in Metromedia, with no opinion gaining a majority of the Court in all its
parts.8 6 A majority of the Court did agree in its review of the particu-7
8
lar restrictions on commercial speech presented in the ordinance,
but considerable differences emerged in all other respects. In what
Justice Rehnquist termed a "virtual Tower of Babel,"88 the various
opinions disagreed not only about the standard of review but also the
impact of the ordinance. For these reasons Metromedia yielded only
limited definitive principles to guide lower courts and municipalities,
especially with regard to restrictions on non-commercial speech.
Justice White's plurality opinion separately reviewed the ordinance's treatment of commercial and non-commercial speech. The
opinion first reviewed the restrictions as applied to commercial speech
and found them to be constitutional.8 9 Justice Stevens joined this portion of the opinion to make it a majority.90 Emphasizing that the
Court has extended less protection to commercial speech than noncommercial speech, 91 Justice White applied the four-part Central
Hudson test to the commercial speech restrictions.92
83. The ordinance defined on-site signs as those "designating the name of the owner
or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such
premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed...." Id. at 494 (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 495 n.3 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
86. Justice White wrote an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stewart.
Id. at 493. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at
521. Justice Stevens, id. at 540, Chief Justice Burger, id. at 555, and Justice

Rehnquist, id. at 569, wrote separate dissents.
87. Justice Stevens joined Justice White's plurality opinion as it applied to commercial speech, thus constituting a majority of the Court. Id. at 541 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part). Further, although not officially joining Justice White's opinion, Chief Justice Burger's and Justice Rehnquises dissenting opinions were in
basic agreement with the thrust of the plurality opinion as it applied to commercial speech. See id. at 555-70 (dissenting opinion).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 504-12 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 504-06 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 507 (plurality opinion).
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In applying the Central Hudson test, Justice White's plurality
opinion acknowledged that the commercial speech was not false or
93
misleading and thus subject to some First Amendment protection.
It proceeded to find that the other prongs of the test were satisfied,
however. The plurality found both traffic safety and aesthetic concerns to be substantial government interests justifying regulation.94
Further, the restrictions were not unnecessarily broad, since the billboards themselves created the traffic and aesthetic concerns. Thus,
restricting commercial signs was narrowly tailored to further the
95
state's interests.
The plurality also found that the ordinance met the third requirement of CentralHudson, that it "directly advance" the asserted interests. Although acknowledging that this presented a more difficult
question, the plurality readily accepted what it viewed as the "common sense" judgment of local governments regarding traffic safety.
Similarly, it stated "[lt is not speculative to recognize that billboards
by their very nature . . .can be perceived as an 'aesthetic harm,'"
again suggesting a common sense approach to whether it directly ad96
vances the state's interest.
Importantly, the plurality also stated that permitting on-site commercial signs while prohibiting off-site commercial signs did not denigrate the asserted state interests. In doing so, the plurality suggested
that even if the ordinance is underinclusive by not prohibiting on-site
as well as off-site signs, the prohibition of off-site signs is still directly
related to the interests of traffic safety and aesthetics.97 Moreover,
the plurality stated that the city could decide that the need to identify
on-site premises outweighed its traffic and aesthetic interests.9 8
Thus, at least with regard to commercial speech, it appears that local
governments have substantial freedom in selecting the scope and
manner in which to balance competing interests.
Though upholding the restrictions on commercial speech, the plurality struck down the restrictions as applied to non-commercial
speech. The Court cited two reasons for striking these restrictions.
First, the plurality said that by permitting on-site commercial signage
but prohibiting off-site non-commercial signage, the ordinance prohibited an on-site owner from displaying a non-commercial sign in exactly
the same space in which he could display a commercial message.
Stressing that the First Amendment provides greater, not lesser, protection for non-commercial speech, the plurality said that the above
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

507 (plurality opinion).
507-08 (plurality opinion).
508 (plurality opinion).
510 (plurality opinion).
511 (plurality opinion).
512 (plurality opinion).
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provision impermissibly reversed the above and was therefore
invalid. 99
Second, the plurality also found the twelve exemptions constitutionally invalid because they were not content neutral. They afforded
greater protection to some non-commercial speech than to others.1 0 0
Thus, the plurality, while permitting municipalities to balance competing values with regard to commercial speech, would not extend the
same latitude with respect to non-commercial speech.
In contrast to the plurality, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Blackmun, viewed the ordinance as having the practical effect of a total ban on billboard use.1 01 Justice Brennan applied
the standard earlier articulated in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim102 for bans on a complete medium of expression, requiring
that such a ban further a sufficiently important interest in a narrowly
tailored fashion. He found that the city failed to establish this. Justice Brennan noted that there were no studies supporting the traffic
hazard posed by billboards.03 Further, he found the city failed to
show it had undertaken a comprehensive regulation of aesthetic concerns,' 04 thus making the ordinance underinclusive. As such, it failed
to pass Schad's heightened scrutiny.
Because he viewed the ordinance as in effect constituting a total
ban on billboards, Justice Brennan did not need to rule on the contentbased concerns emphasized by the plurality. Importantly, however,
he did not rule out the possibility of exemptions of the type found in
Metromedia. In dictum, Justice Brennan anticipated that a city
"might have special goals the accomplishment of which would conflict
with the overall goals addressed by the total billboard ban."105 In order to allow municipalities to balance these concerns, Brennan suggested that he would permit an exemption only if it "furthers an
interest that is at least as important as the interest underlying the
total ban, if the exception is no broader than necessary to advance the
special goal, and if the exception is narrowly drawn so as to impinge
as little as possible on the overall goal."106
The three dissenting opinions all viewed the ordinance as essentially a complete, yet permissible ban on billboards. Although writing
separate opinions, the dissenters all found the city's interest in traffic
safety and aesthetics substantial enough to justify a near complete
99. Id. at 513 (plurality opinion).

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 514-15 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 526-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 527 (1981)(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. at 528-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ban on a single medium of expression.10 7 Further, assuming a complete ban, they would allow municipalities to provide content exemptions from regulation as long as they were not viewpoint based.10S
Thus, they would not only allow substantial freedom in balancing interests with regard to commercial speech, as did the plurality, but
would apply a similar analysis to non-commercial speech as well.
The variety of opinions and nature of the ordinance in Metromedia
limit its precedential value. Nevertheless, several principles emerge
from the decision in spite of these limitations. First, a clear majority
of the Justices held that a municipality could ban off-site commercial
signs even though permitting on-site commercial signs.10 9 In recognizing this, a majority of the Justices apparently would allow municipalities substantial freedom in balancing the relative competing
values involved when regulating commercial signs. Second, a majority of Justices would appear to permit municipalities to place greater
restrictions on commercial than non-commercial signs.110
The Court was less clear about restrictions on non-commercial
speech and the permissibility of content-based distinctions. Although
the plurality rejected any content-based distinctions, at least as affecting non-commercial speech, the concurring and dissenting Justices
were less rigid. The dissenting Justices would readily accept nonviewpoint distinctions,"'1 while the concurring Justices would permit
them in narrow circumstances. 1 12 Further, the opinions also disagreed regarding the validity of a total ban on billboards. Although
the three dissenting Justices would accept a total ban,3- the concur107. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 559-60; (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);

id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 504-06; id. at 540 (Stevens, J., concurring in part)(Justice Stevens joined to

form a majority on this point).
110. Justice White's plurality opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, continually emphasized the lower protection afforded commercial speech, and held the ordinance
valid as applied to commercial speech but invalid as applied to non-commercial
speech. Id. at 504-12 (plurality opinion); id. at 541 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part)(Justice Stevens joined to form a majority on this point). Chief Justice Burger's dissent and Justice Rehnquist's dissent would similarly permit greater restrictions on commercial than non-commercial speech, since they both would
accept any nonviewpoint based distinctions. Id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1514 n.20 (1993)(saying Metromedia did not address

issue). See infra Part VIA of this Article for a general discussion of the issue.

111. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 541-42 (1981)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 559-60; (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ring Justices would subject such a ban to heightened scrutiny because
of its perceived suppressive effect on speech. The plurality did not address the issue but in a footnote suggested that a complete ban on
billboards would be problematic because it would suppress an entire

medium of communication.X14 Despite this footnote, however, the plu-

rality's perception of the ordinance as less than a complete ban despite
its extensive reach indicates a willingness to subject signs and billboards to substantial restrictions.
Thus, although establishing a groundwork for analysis, the Court's
decision in Metromedia left mostly unanswered questions. Three
years later, in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,115
the Supreme Court partially addressed some of those issues, though in
a slightly different context.
C. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent the Supreme
Court reviewed a Los Angeles ordinance which prohibited the posting
of any sign, whether commercial or non-commercial, on public property.l"6 As in the case of Metromedia, the asserted interests behind
the ordinance were traffic safety and aesthetics-the "elimination of
'visual clutter.'-zz7 The ordinance was challenged by Taxpayers for
Vincent, a group which attached cardboard political campaign signs to
public utility poles. Thus, the case directly presented the issue of sign
restrictions as applied to political speech.
The Supreme Court essentially viewed the ordinance as a time,
place, and manner regulation on sp6ech and said it would be upheld if
it furthered a "sufficiently substantial" state interest, was no broader
than necessary to accomplish that interest, and left ample alternatives for expression.' 1 8 In applying this standard, the Court first
found that the city's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics were sufficiently substantial to justify reasonable regulation of First Amendment activities."1 9 In this regard the Court apparently relied on the
District Court's finding that the ordinance would produce some aesthetic benefit, and therefore focused its discussion on whether this
type of interest was sufficient to justify a First Amendment restriction. Relying heavily upon Metromedia, the Court held that aesthetic
goals could justify First Amendment restrictions.' 20
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 515 n.20 (plurality opinion).
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 823 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 805-12.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 806-07.
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The Court also relied on Metromediain holding that the ordinance
was narrowly tailored, stating that since the signs themselves produced visual blight, their prohibition did "no more than eliminate the
exact source of the evil."'21 The Court distinguished this from instances in which the harm to be avoided was a byproduct of, but severable from, the expression itself.122
Importantly, in upholding the ordinance the Court suggested that
the municipality had some flexibility to selectively balance competing
interests. Although the ordinance was admittedly underinclusive in
that it did not also prohibit signs on private property which might be
equally unattractive, the Court stated that this did not compromise
the asserted state interest. Noting that a similar argument had been
rejected in Metromedia, the Court stated:
So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property
justifies the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all
locations, a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary
signs is preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep
the posting of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some
visual blight remains, a partial,
content-neutral ban may nevertheless en123
hance the City's appearance.

Finally, the Court also examined whether the ordinance provided
adequate alternative means of expression.' 24 Emphasizing that the
First Amendment does not guarantee the best or most effective means
of expression, the Court noted that alternatives existed in this case,
such as distributing leaflets on the same site.125 It also stated that
there was no indication that the posting of signs on public property
was a uniquely valuable or important means of communication,12 6
suggesting that if such were the case, additional First Amendment
safeguards might be required. The Court similarly rejected the assertion that utility poles were a public forum requiring some access, stating that there was no showing that a traditional right of access existed
for utility poles and that the city had an interest in controlling use of
its own property.127
Vincent therefore affirms and expands some basic principles from
Metromedia. Most notably the Court reaffirmed that traffic safety and
aesthetics are substantial state interests with regard to regulating
First Amendment conduct. Secondly, the Court will permit muimcipalities freedom in pursuing partial, content-neutral restrictions on
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 808.
Id. at 809-10.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814-15.

1995]

SIGN REGULATION

non-commercial speech, even if they are underinclusive. The more difficult and troubling aspect of Vincent, however, was the ease with
which the Court found adequate alternatives. In this respect the opinion is arguably at odds with Linmark, where the Court found alternatives to "for sale" signs inadequate. Whereas the Court in Linmark
emphasized that alternatives would have greater cost and be less effective, 2 8 the Court in Vincent was willing to settle for alternatives
that would pose those same problems and thus, arguably suppress
speech opportunities. This same issue regarding the adequacy of alternatives for sign restrictions was the primary focus in the Court's
most recent sign decision, City of Ladue v. Gilleo.129
D.

City of Ladue v. Gilleo

In its most recent decision concerning sign restrictions, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court reviewed an ordinance which prohibited all
residential signs except "residence identification" signs, "for sale"
signs, and safety hazard signs. It also allowed churches and several
other establishments to display signs not permitted to be displayed by
homeowners.130 The ordinance was challenged by a citizen who was
told that a lawn sign and later a small window sign protesting the war
in the Persian Gulf were prohibited.131
After reviewing its prior cases involving sign regulations, the
Court began its analysis by recounting that an ordinance might be
infirm either because it restricted "too little" speech or because it restricted "too much."132 Although the court of appeals invalidated the
ordinance on the former ground because it found the exemptions violated content-neutrality,13 3 the Supreme Court instead relied on the
second rationale to strike down the ordinance.134 In doing so, however, the Court noted that content distinctions shed some light on the
question of whether the ordinance restricts too much speech, since
they may undermine the strength of the state's interest in regulation
by demonstrating that the City itself found the interest outweighed in
some instances.' 3 5 Implicit in this is the recognition that the question
of restricting "too much" involves a weighing of the First Amendment
concerns against the asserted state interest.
In proceeding to find that the ban on residential signs restricted
"too much" speech, the Court began by noting that the impact on
128.
129.
130.
131.

Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 79, 93 (1977).
114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
Id. at 2040.
Id.

132. Id. at 2043.

133. Ladue v. Gilleo, 986 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
134. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044-47 (1994).

135. Id. at 2044.
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speech was much greater than in Linmark, where the Court had held
a ban on "for sale" signs invalid.' 3 6 Further, the Court distinguished
its decision in Vincent where it had upheld a prohibition on posting
signs on public property. Although acknowledging that the ban in
Vincent was quite broad, the Court there had specifically found that
placing signs on public property was not a "uniquely valuable and important mode of communication."' 3 7 In contrast, the ordinance in Lameans of
due had "almost completely foreclosed a venerable
8
communication that is both unique and important."'3
In analyzing the significance of the restricted speech, the Court
first suggested that the restriction might have foreclosed an entire
medium of expression and thus require heightened scrutiny. The
Court recalled that previous bans on entire media of expression, such
as handbill distribution, door-to-door solicitation, and live entertainment, had been held invalid.139
Second, and more central to its analysis, the Court stated that even
if the restrictions did not foreclose an entire medium of expression,
they failed to leave adequate alternative modes of expression and
were therefore invalid.14 0 In this regard the Court emphasized that
signs on a residence are unique because their location provides information about the identity of the speaker, which is a critical component
in evaluating a message. Further, residential signs are a convenient
and inexpensive form of communication, which for people of modest
means have no practical substitute.141 Finally, the Court emphasized
that there is special protection for speech associated with the home,
dismayed" to learn they
noting that people would be "understandably
42
could not display signs from their homes.1
The Court also found it significant that homeowners have strong
incentives to maintain property values and avoid visual clutter on
their property-incentives that don't exist when placing signs on the
property of others.143 A similar observation was made in Vincent, justifying an ordinance which permitted signs on private but not public
property by reasoning that "private property owners' esthetic concerns
will keep the posting of signs on their property within reasonable
bounds."'144 Although self-policing by private property owners does
136. The Court emphasized that in Linmark the ordinance applied only to a form of
commercial speech, whereas in Ladue it prohibited "virtually any 'sign' on [the]
property." Id. at 2045.
137. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
138. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2046.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2047.
143. Id. at 2047.
144. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984).
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not make a medium uniquely valuable, the Court apparently treats it
as a factor in assessing the strength of the state's interest and when
deciding whether an ordinance restricts "too much" speech.
The Ladue Court struck down the ordinance because it restricted
"too much" speech, and therefore, did not address the validity of the
content-distinctions on which the court of appeals had invalidated the
restriction. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice O'Connor noted
the unorthodox approach of the majority in analyzing the suppressive
effect of the ordinance rather than examining the content-distinctions,
which is usually the first step in analysis.145 In particular, she suggested that an analysis of the content-distinctions would have
presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify some of the particularly problematic aspects of the Court's content-neutrality requirement.146 Thus, although Ladue helped clarify when a sign restriction
might suppress "too much" speech, it left unresolved the significant
issue of when an ordinance might be invalid because it restricts
speech "too little."
The rest of this Article will examine more closely the dual concerns
recognized in Ladue of restricting "too much" speech and restricting
"too little," by focusing on three areas. First, it will briefly discuss
when a sign or billboard ordinance might restrict speech "too much" by
suppressing significant means of communication. Second, the Article
will examine content-neutral restrictions and the extent they may restrict speech "too little" by being underinclusive. Third, it will examine the problem of restricting speech "too little" with regard to
content-based distinctions.
IV.

SUPPRESSIVE EFFECT AND THE PROBLEM OF "TOO
MUCH"

As noted in Ladue, a regulation on First Amendment activity will
be invalid where it goes too far and regulates "too much" speech.147
Although lower court decisions have not ordinarily focused on this
concern with respect to sign and billboard regulations, the Supreme
Court in Ladue used this as the basis for invalidating a restriction on
political lawn signs. 148 Several lower court decisions have similarly
held such restrictions invalid, noting, as did the Supreme Court, the
important role such signs played.149 The applicability of this standard beyond residential lawn signs is still unclear, however.
145. City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038,2047-48 (1994)(O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 2048 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2043, 2044-47.

148. See id. at 2046-47.
149. See Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, Va., 983 F.2d 587
(4th Cir. 1993); Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913
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By their very nature, sign regulations typically restrict only one
type of expression, leaving speakers free to pursue other modes of
communication. As indicated by the Court's decision in Ladue, however, concerns about "too much" not only concern restrictions on the
total quantity of speech, but more typically concern restrictions on
uniquely important or significant means of communication. For this
reason the Court has consistently required that for restrictions to be
valid they must leave adequate or ample alternatives. 150 Where a
regulation fails to leave adequate alternatives or intrudes on uniquely
important means of communication, the Court will closely scrutinize
the regulation, including an assessment of whether the restriction is
underinclusive. More often than not the regulation fails such
scrutiny.'51
A review of Supreme Court sign cases indicates that the most
likely situation in which an ordinance might restrict "too much"
speech is where it eliminates a "uniquely valuable" means of communication, thereby leaving the speaker with inadequate alternatives.
The recognition of inadequate alternatives to "for sale" signs in
Linmark and residential signs in Ladue was premised upon the
unique function they served for the message conveyed.' 5 2 Conversely,
in upholding the restriction in Vincent, the Court emphasized that
there was no indication that posting signs on public property was a
"uniquely valuable or important mode of communication." Indeed, it
was on this precise point that the Court in Ladue distinguished
Vincent.153
In analyzing whether a particular sign is "uniquely valuable" and
deserving of protection, it is helpful to distinguish between the two
broad functions served by signs and billboards. First, signs serve as a
means by which individual property owners can communicate with
others. This might range from simply telling people who a person is to
expressing opinions on vital topics. Second, signs also serve as a medium for people unrelated to particular property to communicate ideas
or sell products, typically by renting space from others. As such, the
sign does not serve as an expression of a particular property owner but

150.
151.
152.
153.

(1977); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972); State v. Miller, 416 A.2d
821 (N.J. 1980); City of Euclid v. Mabel, 484 N.E.2d 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
(1984).
See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943).
See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 79, 93 (1977); City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994).
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994).
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rather as a medium of expression unrelated to the ownership of the
property.
The Supreme Court sign cases, and in particular Ladue, suggest
that courts should be most speech protective of signs in the first category-where they are used by a property owner as such. Read together, the cases suggest several reasons. First, signs used by
property owners typically have locational significance, either by communicating information unique to the property as in Linmark or by
providing information about the speaker as in Ladue. In contrast, in
Vincent there was no unique connection between the speaker and
placing signs on public utility poles; the message was neither tied to
that location nor revealed the identity of the speaker in a significant
way. The Court in Ladue emphasized this general point when it
stated that the precise location of most signs, except for on-site signs,
are of less communicative importance than residential signs, explaining that "a commercial advertiser or campaign publicist is15likely to be
relatively indifferent between one sign site and another." 4
Second, Ladue also emphasized that signs displayed by a private
property owner were more likely to be restrained for reasons of selfinterest, mitigating the normal aesthetic concerns which accompany
signs. 5 5 Although this does not directly bear on whether such signs
are "uniquely valuable," it is relevant to the implicit balancing of interests engaged in when assessing whether speech is restricted "too
much". In making this point, the Court in Ladue again distinguished
residential signs from signs erected "on others' land, in others' neighproperty," which would lack an incentive to miniborhood, or on public
156
mize visual clutter.
For these reasons the Court appears most protective of signs displayed on the property of the displayer. The clearest examples of this
category are the residential signs protected in Ladue. The question
remains how far this right extends to private property ownership beyond the unique context of the home. It might well be argued that
Ladue supports extending protection to signs on any private property,
whether residential or not. Signs on non-residential private property
would still serve to identify the speaker as in Ladue. Moreover, private non-residential owners would have incentives to minimize aesthetic harm. Indeed, both in discussing the locational significance of
residential signs and the incentive to self-regulate, the Court in Ladue
contrasted residential signs with signs that would appear on the prop154. Id. at 2046 n.15.
155. Id. at 2047.
156. Id. The Court made a similar observation in Vincent, stating that "private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting of signs on their property
within reasonable bounds." Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984).
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erty of others.157 This arguably suggests the significance of these concerns turns on the signs' connection to the property owner.
Nevertheless, the Ladue holding was also deeply grounded in the
constitutional significance of the home for expression. The Court
stated that a "special respect for individual liberty in the home has
long been a part of our culture and our law," which has "special
resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability
to speak there."158 Further, people would be "understandably dismayed" to learn they could not display political signs from their
homes.159 For these reasons the case for recognizing the rights of nonresidential property owners to display signs is less compelling.
The issue of whether special protection extends to other private
property ownership arises with two types of signs. First are on-site
signs, typically used to identify activities occurring on the land. These
usually identify commercial activities, such as goods or services, but
might also identify various non-commercial activities, such as
churches, political organizations, or community associations. The
Court in Ladue specifically mentioned the communicative importance
of the precise location of such signs, along with residential signs, distingnishing them from signs located on others' property. 160 Indeed, in
one sense the location of on-site signs has greater communicative importance than the residential signs at issue in Ladue, since the content of on-site signs directly relates to the property itself and for which
there are no adequate alternatives. At the same time, however, the
locational significance of on-site signs are largely limited to identification purposes; for other purposes, such as advertising a product or promoting an idea, they are not unique.
As a practical matter, courts have not had to address this issue,
since almost all sign ordinances exempt on-site signs. On balance,
though, the unique role such signs play for identification should require some accommodation, since identification certainly serves important speech interests.' 61 This is particularly so because the First
Amendment interests involved can be adequately met by a one-signper-premises limit, which in turn would substantially limit the extent
of aesthetic and traffic concerns that might result. When balanced
against the First Amendment interests involved, especially the lack of
any adequate alternatives to communicate the intended message,
some minimum accommodation should be required for on-site signs.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 n.15, 2047 (1994).
Id. at 2047.
Id.
Id. at 2046 n.15.
See Bond, supra note 20, at 2506 (arguing that on-site signs should be constitutionally protected because message cannot be communicated elsewhere or
through a different medium).
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The second type of private property signs that are possibly
"uniquely valuable" under Ladue would be where the owner of a nonresidential facility, such as a commercial or industrial establishment,
displays a sign which is not intended to identify the property, but one
which expresses the personal convictions of the owner. Such a sign
would be off-site, since it does not concern activities on the property,
and as such would not necessarily lack adequate alternatives in the
same way as on-site signs. However, such signs arguably are
"uniquely valuable" in the same way as residential signs in Ladue, in
that they identify the speaker behind the message. These signs would
also provide a cheap and convenient mode of communication, which,
though not dispositive, was a factor in Ladue.62 Moreover, as in Ladue, property owners would have an incentive to control signs on their
own property, thus helping to temper the aesthetic concerns posed by
such signs.
Admittedly, however, non-residential signs do not invoke the special solicitude for speech associated with the home, the final factor in
Ladue. Although owners have some autonomy interest in even nonresidential property, the "respect for individual liberty" and special
protection for speech is not nearly as substantial for these signs. The
case for recognizing signs attendant to non-residential land uses as
"uniquely valuable" is therefore not as compelling as with residential
signs.
Nonetheless, even the owner of non-residential property has some
autonomy interest in that property and would likely be "dismayed" to
learn that signs reflecting personal views could not be displayed. This
expectation of autonomy, together with the locational significance of
such signs, suggest some accommodation should be made for signs on
non-residential property.1 6 3 Most certainly the ability to place signs
in windows of non-residential establishments should be permitted absent a compelling government interest. Even modest exterior signs
should be permitted unless a sufficiently substantial interest can be
shown. This is not to say that non-residential property deserves the
same level of protection afforded residential signs in Ladue. But the
locational significance of such signs, the limited autonomy of even
nonresidential property ownership, and the naturally restraining effect of posting signs on one's own property, indicate that some level of
scrutiny is required when such signs are restricted.
The discussion so far suggests that when a sign serves to express
the views of a private property owner, constitutional protection should
be afforded to varying degrees. The analysis is much different, however, for signs that serve as a medium for third parties to more
162. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994).

163. See Bond, supra note 20, at 2503 (suggesting that property owners might have
right to display any non-commercial message).
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broadly disseminate their views. These signs-typically rented for
the purpose of communicating various commercial and non-commercial messages-are not locationally significant, since their message
does not relate to the property, nor does it identify the speaker. In
that sense they more closely resemble the signs in Vincent, which had
no connection to the property in question.1 6 4 Similarly, the users of
such signs would not have the same incentive as private property own6
ers to limit visual clutter.1 5
This analysis is strongly suggested in Ladue itself. In assessing
whether the ban on residential signs restricted "too much" speech, the
Court distinguished them from signs unrelated to the property. In
particular, in reflecting on the locational significance of residential
signs, the Court noted that the location of other signs was less important, stating that "a commercial advertiser or campaign publicist is
likely to be relatively indifferent between one sign site and another."166 Similarly, when discussing the incentive of private property owners to avoid visual clutter, the Court said such incentives
would be lacking for people who erect signs on others' land.167 For
these reasons signs unrelated to property ownership are not "uniquely
valuable" and the prohibition of any particular sign at a particular
location would certainly not be restricting "too much" speech.
A different concern arises, however, when a broad category of signs
are banned throughout a town. In such a situation, the focus changes
from the unique value of any particular sign to the value of the category as a whole. Although the value of any particular sign is minimal,
access to signs generally as a medium of communication is more substantial. A general prohibition of a broad sign category, such as billboards, might be viewed as foreclosure of an entire medium of
expression. The Court has on occasion indicated that such retrictions
6
will be closely scrutinized.1 s
This analysis is most clearly developed in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Metromedia, where he interpreted the San Diego ordinance to be a complete ban on billboards, which he considered a
distinct medium of expression. 1 69 As a result, Justice Brennan applied the standard articulated in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim17O for bans on a complete medium of expression, requiring
164. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
165. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038,2045 (1994); Members of City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984).
166. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 n.15 (1994).
167. Id. at 2047.
168. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71 (1981). See generally
Stone, supra note 15, at 64-67.
169. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 526-27 (1981)(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
170. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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that it further a sufficiently substantial interest in a narrowly tailored
fashion.171 Justice Brennan found that the San Diego ordinance
failed to establish this, first noting that there were no studies supporting traffic hazards posed by billboards.172 Further, he argued that the
city failed to show it had undertaken a comprehensive regulation of
aesthetic concerns in the regulated commercial and industrial districts, and thus any aesthetic benefit in that context was insubstantial.17s Thus, a complete ban might be valid where the medium of
billboards would be clearly incompatible with a particular community.
The plurality in Metromedia also hinted in a footnote that a complete ban of billboards might be problematic. Although expressly stating it was not addressing the validity of a complete ban, the Court
cited to Schad regarding the type of problem a complete ban would
pose.17 4 The potential problem of restricting a distinct medium of
signs was also mentioned in Ladue, where the Court suggested that
residential signs might constitute a distinct medium of expression, the
prohibition of which would require heightened scrutiny. The Court
recalled other cases in which the Court struck down prohibitions on
various media of expression, such as handbills, pamphlets, and doorto-door distribution of literature.175 These cases suggested that a
broad ban on a type of sign, such as billboards, forecloses an entire
medium of expression and requires heightened scrutiny.
There are several problems with this approach, however. First and
most obvious is the determination of whether a restriction bans a distinct medium or is merely a regulation of a broader medium.176 For
example, a billboard prohibition can be viewed as a ban on a distinct
medium (billboards), or merely a regulation within the broader medium of all signs, some of which would be allowed. For this reason the
Court in Vincent questioned the utility of trying to decide whether a
particular form of expression, in that case posting signs on utility
171. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528 (1981)(Brennan, J.,

concurring).
Id. at 528-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 530-32 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 515 n.20 (plurality).
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981)(live entertainment); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49 (1943)(door-to-door distribution of literature);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)(handbills on public streets); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939)(handbills on public
streets)(citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,451-52 (1938)(distribution of
pamphlets)).
176. See Williams, supra note 13, at 638 n.99 (stating that except for extreme situations, line between a ban and a regulation cannot be easily drawn). See also,
Stone, supra note 15, at 66-67 (1987)Cnoting difficulty of determination but suggesting still worthwhile).
172.
173.
174.
175.
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poles, constituted a discrete medium of communication.1 7 7 Focusing
on the unique advantages of a particular mode of expression, rather
than on whether it constitutes a separate medium of expression, is
often more to the point.
Second, even if billboards or some other sign category are considered a discrete medium, the problems posed by their possible prohibition are not necessarily the same as restrictions on other media. For
example, the restricted medium in Schad was live entertainment, a
unique mode of expression for which there are no adequate alternatives. The communicative message and ideas of Hamlet cannot be adequately captured by radio, newspaper ads, handbills or signs. In
contrast, the fundamental message of signs can be readily conveyed
through such alternatives, though perhaps with some added expense
8
and inconvenience.17
Nor do billboards necessarily provide advantages similar to those
found with other protected media, such as leafletting or door-to-door
distribution of literature. Although the content expressed through
such means might be adaptable to other media, the Court has stressed
the important role they play as an inexpensive means of communication, especially for the poor.' 79 Signs might play a comparable role
from the perspective of an individual landownerSO but not necessarily
from the perspective of a third party seeking a medium of communication. This would be especially true about billboards, which require
some expense' 8 ' and typically are used not to express the views of a
landowner but rather to advertise. Although billboards certainly offer
some advantages in terms of expense and convenience, they lack the
types of advantages deemed most important in other cases.
For these reasons communities should be able to impose substantial restrictions on sign categories, billboards in particular, to further
aesthetic and traffic safety concerns. This does not mean that substantial restrictions are not subject to some scrutiny. Certainly any
restriction must directly advance a significant state interest. 8 2 For
sign regulations this would require that the restriction would appreci177. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 n.32 (1984).
178. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 562-63 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49 (1943)(door-to-door
distribution of literature is "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939). See also,
TRIBE, supra note 45, §§ 12-23 (explaining that First Amendment restrictions
that fall with greater force on the poor are scrutinized with special care).
180. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994).
181. See National Advertising Co. v. City of Bridgeton, 626 F. Supp. 837, 840 (E.D.

Mo. 1985)(noting that billboard use not designed for the poor).
182. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993);
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811-12 (1984).
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ably further aesthetic goals. Where this can be shown, however, the
restriction should be valid.
Under this approach residential communities should be able to impose broad and even complete bans on billboards and similar sign categories. Even Justice Brennan's analysis in Metromedia would
apparently permit this, since he would evaluate the state's aesthetic
interest by how incompatible billboards would be with the surrounding area.18 3 Indeed, he stated that-some cities would have no problem
establishing a substantial aesthetic interest, giving as an example historic Williamsburg, Virginia, where billboards would clearly be out of
place.1 S4 This, of course, is an extreme example, but it illustrates the
point: bans should be permissible where the regulated signs, such as
billboards, do not fit in with the community. This standard should be
clearly met with towns which are almost exclusively residential in
character.
More problematic are attempts to ban billboards from larger communities which include commercial and industrial districts, as was
the case in Metromedia. As noted by Justice Brennan, billboards are
"not necessarily inconsistent" with such areas and therefore might not
distract from their appearanc. 1 8 5 He would therefore require that
the billboard regulation be part of a comprehensive effort to improve
the area's appearance.1 8 6 Although this should be sufficient to justify
a ban, arguably any set of restrictions that would result in an actual
enhancement of aesthetics and appearance should be valid. Indeed,
this is essentially the standard applied in Vincent,187 where the Court
declined to apply the analysis developed by Justice Brennan in Metromedia.188 Since under normal circumstances a billboard ban does
not substantially burden the First Amendment, a similar analysis is
appropriate. Where a billboard restriction would have only a negligible impact on appearance, however, it should be invalid.
Thus, the analysis in this section draws a distinction between signs
identified with property owners, for which some protection should be
afforded, and the broader concept of billboards as a medium for third
parties, which deserves less protection. Such a distinction makes
183. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 530-32 (1981)(Brennan,
J., concurring).
184. Id. at 533-342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 531-33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
187. The court of appeals in Vincent had held the restriction on placing signs on public
property invalid because the city was not engaged in a comprehensive effort to
remove other causes of an unattractive environment. The Supreme Court rejected that approach, and instead only required that the ban actually enhance the
city's appearance. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 805-08, 807 n.25 (1984).
188. Id. at 807 n.25.
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sense, since signs associated with property ownership have a locational significance which billboards lack. It also preserves speech
where liberty and autonomy concerns are greatest, most notably with
residential property, but to lesser degrees with other private property.
Finally, as suggested by the Court in Ladue, property owners will
have an incentive to control any possible abuses, which will lead to a
natural balance of aesthetic and speech interests.
V. THE PROBLEM OF "TOO LITTLE": UNDERINCLUSIVE
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
A second category of signs which presents regulatory concerns is
selective yet content-neutral restrictions. Municipalities, of course,
might pursue a variety of content-neutral restrictions on signs and
billboards, designed to accommodate communicative needs while furthering state interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. Most basic are
regulations restricting the size, type, and placement of signs and billboards. Municipalities will usually also have district-based regulations in which signs and billboards are restricted to certain areas of
the city, such as commercial and industrial districts. Finally, and
more problematic, are restrictions on the type, number, or duration of
signs.
As noted in Part II, the Supreme Court has generally been tolerant
of content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions that do not
suppress speech. For that reason basic restrictions on the size and
height of billboards have proved uncontroversial and have been consistently upheld by lower courts.18 9 By their very nature such restrictions have a de minimus impact on speech and yet address aesthetic
concerns which they may present. Similarly, restrictions on sign
placement within a particular district have been viewed as reasonable. For example, requirements that a sign or billboard be placed a
certain distance from a street or highway have been upheld.190 Similarly, restrictions which insist that signs or billboards not appear
within a certain distance of a historical site have been upheld as necessary to preserve the special nature of such districts.91
189. See, e.g., Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 734 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd,
989 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1993)(size restriction valid); National Advertising Co. v.
Village of Downers Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300 (IMl. App. Ct., 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1261 (1991)(size restriction valid); City of Albuquerque v. Jackson, 684 P.2d
543 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)(height restriction valid).
190. See Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1384 (Conn. 1989)(prohibition on billboards
within 500 feet of highway exchange valid); Department of Transp. v. Shiflett,
310 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 1984)(prohibition on billboards within 660 feet of highways valid).
191. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992)(signs prohibited within 300 feet of historic site); Corey Outdoor Advertising v. Board of Zon-

1995]

SIGN REGULATION

A similar, deferential analysis is appropriate for regulations which
limit billboard or sign use to certain districts and thus exclude them
from others. Most common are ordinances which ban billboards from
residential areas but permit them in commercial and industrial districts.' 9 2 Similarly, banning off-site signs in a historic district has
been found valid.93 Such districting regulations are, of course, a
clear example of a time, place, and manner regulation which do not
ban a particular communicative activity but merely regulate its location. As such, in most instances they represent a reasonable accommodation of speech interests by permitting some billboard use in
particular districts.
All of the above regulations would appear to be valid content-neutral restrictions. Potential problems arise, however, with regard to
content-neutral restrictions which prohibit or more severely restrict
particular types of signs within the same area, thus posing underinclusiveness concerns. Although both Metromedia and Vincent suggest
that municipalities have substantial freedom in structuring underinclusive regulations, lower courts have been in conflict regarding certain types of underinclusive regulations. Most troublesome have been
bans or restrictions on portable or temporary signs, as opposed to permanent signs. Municipalities have increasingly placed special regulations or prohibitions on portable signs in recent years, and lower
courts have been evenly divided regarding their validity.'94
As discussed in the previous section, when certain signs are selectively regulated, an initial inquiry is whether the regulation restricts
"too much" speech. For example, if a ban on portable signs would include residential lawn signs, it would certainly run afoul of Ladue.195
On the other hand, requiring that on-site identification signs be permanent or prohibiting portable general advertising signs would likely
not pose problems of restricting "too much" speech.196
ing Adjustment, 327 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. 1985)(signs prohibited within 300 feet of
historic site).

192. See Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987); State v.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Lotze, 593 P.2d 811 (Wash.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979).
See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992).
See supra note 21.
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045-47.
Although it might be argued that portable signs constitute a distinct medium of
expression and therefore should not be altogether prohibited, see Signs, Inc. v.
Orange County, 592 F. Supp. 693, 695 (M.D. Fla. 1983), as discussed in Part IV,
characterizing the issue in that way is of little help. See Members of City Council
v. Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 n.32 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 556-57 (1981)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Moreover,
although portable signs present some cost and convenience benefits, as a general
advertising medium they lack the locational significance and self-regulatory nature of the residential signs protected in Ladue, and thus are more similar to the
unprotected signs in Vincent.
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Assuming the restriction does not restrict "too much" speech, the
issue is whether a valid basis exists for drawing the regulatory distinction. Of course, where it can be established that a particular type
of sign-such as portable signs-presents distinct secondary effects in
terms of aesthetics or traffic safety, then a valid basis for distinct regulation exists. For example, cities often assert that portable signs
present distinct concerns, such as electrical problems, insecure placement, and a greater likelihood that the signs will deteriorate. 19 7 As a
practical matter, however, problems such as these can usually be addressed by less narrow means than a comprehensive ban, such as
maintenance or anchoring requirements. 19 8
Where there are no distinct secondary effects, however, or where
purported secondary effects can be addressed more narrowly, special
restrictions or bans on portable signs are arguably underinclusive by
addressing only some of the articulated problem. Several decisions
have struck down such restrictions, usually stating that the distinction failed to advance the state's interests in aesthetics or traffic
safety.19 9 In particular, these cases have noted that since portable
signs are equally distracting and as visually obnoxious as permanent
2 00
signs, a local government cannot regulate one and not the other.
In contrast, a number of other courts have upheld the portable/permanent distinction as valid. In doing so courts have reasoned that a
separate restriction on portable signs is valid as long as it would have
a discernible aesthetic benefit, even if it is underinclusive by not regulating permanent signs. 2 01 They have also emphasized that municipalities should have the freedom to selectively regulate portable signs
in order to partially further their interests. For example, in Lindsay
v. City of San Antonio,2 02 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated

that cities can pursue the "elimination of visual clutter in a piecemeal
fashion."2 03 Similarly, in Harnish v. Manatee County, 2 04 the Eleventh
197. See Barber v. Anchorage, 776 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Alaska 1989); Risner v. City of
Wyoming, 383 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
198. See Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982); Risner v. City
of Wyoming, 383 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
199. See Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Dills v. Cobb County,
593 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1985); Signs,
Inc. v. Orange County, 592 F. Supp. 693 (M.D. Fla. 1983); All American Sign
Rentals, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 592 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Rhodes v.
Gwinnett County, 557 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Risner v. City of Wyoming,
383 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
200. See Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1982); Signs, Inc.
v. Orange County, 592 F. Supp. 693, 697 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
201. See Mobile Sign, Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 670 F. Supp. 68,73 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
202. 821 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987).
203. Id. at 1109.
204. 783 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit emphasized that government must have freedom in deciding
how much protection to have and how to structure it.205
The split in these cases primarily turns on the extent to which a
local government can structure partial, underinclusive sign ordi20 6
nances in order to strike an appropriate balance of regulation.
Since the signs themselves generate the aesthetic and traffic concerns
supporting regulation, anything more than a de minimus regulation of
portable signs will advance the state's interest to some degree. The
only problem, therefore, is whether the underinclusive nature of the
regulation, an area of frequent concern for the Supreme Court,20 7 denigrates the asserted interests and undercuts the basis for regulation.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the underinclusive nature of
First amendment restrictions in two contexts. First, the Court has
emphasized the underinclusive nature of content-based regulations as
an additional reason to strike an ordinance down, noting that permitting some speech based on content denigrates the asserted state interests in restricting other speech. 20 8 Second, the Court has emphasized
the underinclusive nature of content-neutral regulations which restrict speech while permitting non-expressive activities with similar
problems. For example, striking down a restriction on live entertainment in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,20 9 the Court emphasized that the town failed to restrict non-First Amendment activities,
such as commercial uses, which would generate comparably objectionable secondary effects. The Court noted that by permitting commercial uses which presented similar objections as the regulated speech
2 10
the town undermined the significance of any regulatory interest.

These cases might suggest that a municipality cannot structure
underinclusive regulations where no basis exists for distinguishing between types of signs because any asserted aesthetic and traffic safety
interest in regulation is denigrated by permitting other signs with
comparable effects. However, in contrast to the above cases, both Metromedia and Vincent suggest municipalities have substantial freedom in structuring underinclusive sign and billboard regulations. In
205. Id. at 1539.
206. Compare,e.g., Dills v. Cobb County, 593 F. Supp. 170, 173 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd,
755 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1985Xemphasizing lack of evidence that portable signs
are more displeasing than permanent signs and therefore distinction invalid)
with Mobile Sign, Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 670 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.N.Y.
1987)(distinction valid because cities can structure underinclusive restrictions).
207. For a general discussion of the Court's treatment of underinclusive restrictions
on expression, see William E. Lee, The FirstAmendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 71 WASH. U. LQ. 637 (1993).
208. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-15
(1993); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 455-65 (1980).
209. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
210. Id. at 75-76.
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Metromedia a majority of the Justices rejected an argument that the
city could not permit billboards to be used for on-site advertising and
prohibit off-site advertising on aesthetic grounds, since both were
equally unattractive. The plurality, joined by Justice Stevens, emphasized that whether the ordinance was underinclusive or not, the prohibition on off-site advertising nevertheless furthered the city's
aesthetic objectives. 2 1 ' More importantly, it also stated that the city
could choose to value one type of commercial speech over another, into strike a particular balance of speech and aesdicating the latitude
21 2
thetic interests.
The Court's decision in Vincent perhaps even more clearly grants
municipalities freedom in structuring underinclusive regulations.
The regulation upheld in Vincent banned signs on public property but
permitted signs on private property. Although the restriction was underinclusive in that signs on private property presented the same aesthetic concerns as signs on public property, the Court noted that the
city could determine that a private citizen's interest in controlling the
use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment.2 13 More significantly, the Court also noted that by permitting signs on private
property, the city has preserved some speech opportunities. 2 14 This
indicates that attempts to balance speech and aesthetic concerns with
content-neutral distinctions are valid. Finally, the Court noted that
there was no finding that there were so many signs on private property that a ban on public signs would be inconsequential. This sugbe invalid if it had no discernable effect
gests that a prohibition would
2 15
on the asserted interests.
The Court's approval of underinclusive regulations in Metromedia
and Vincent makes sense in light of the nature of those regulations as
compared to instances where the Court has expressed concern about
underinclusive restrictions. The Court has been concerned about underinclusive regulations when discrimination might occur against particular speech because of its content or against speech relative to
nonexpressive activities. Because the possibility of improper motives
is strong in such situations, the Court is justified in more closely scrutinizing regulations. The Court recognizes that the state's interest is
denigrated by the permitted activities.
The regulations in Metromedia and Vincent, however, did not present the above concerns; rather, by regulating the type and location of
signs the local governments merely regulated the manner of speech.
211. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981)(plurality
opinion).
212. See id.
213. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984).
214. Id. at 811.
215. See id.
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In such a situation the underinclusive nature of a restriction does not
suggest an improper motive, but rather a legitimate effort to balance
First Amendment and aesthetic concerns. In such a situation, permitting some speech should not be seen as compromising the state's interest but as an effort to provide speech opportunities.2 1 6 Indeed, to
punish cities for accommodating speech by such selective regulations
might well push cities to more stringent restrictions.
For these reasons local governments should have substantial freedom in structuring content-neutral regulations, even when they are
underinclusive. For example, even where portable signs present no
distinct secondary concerns, cities should still be able to prohibit them
while permitting permanent signs, as a legitimate means of balancing
speech and aesthetic interests. The one instance where a content-neutral, underinclusive regulation would be invalid is where the restricted speech is so minor relative to permitted signs that there
would be no perceived aesthetic or traffic benefits. Such a restriction
and therefore be an unneceswould fail to advance any state21interest
7
sary restriction on expression.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF "TOO LITTLE": CONTENT-BASED
DISTINCTIONS
Although the problem of restricting "too little" speech might occur
with content-neutral provisions, it usually occurs in the context of content-based distinctions. The validity of such restrictions has proved to
be the most problematic aspect of sign and billboard regulations.
Though courts have generally recognized the need for content-neutrality, local governments commonly incorporate various content-distinctions in sign and billboard ordinances. These range from more general
distinctions between on-site and off-site signs and commercial and
non-commercial signs, to prohibitions and exemptions based on specific content.
The extent to which content-distinctions can be incorporated into a
sign ordinance is not altogether clear. Members of the Supreme Court
have occasionally shown disagreement with the idea of regulating "too
little" speech, suggesting that if a broader restriction is permissible,
then permitting some speech is logically preferable to a complete ban.
This "lesser is included in the greater" position was in fact advocated
by the dissenters in Metromedia. They reasoned that if a broader
standard was valid, a municipality could draw distinctions, even
216. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 ("a significant opportunity to communicate ... is preserved" by permitting speech on
private property while prohibiting it on public property).
217. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811-12 (1984).
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based on content, as long as it was viewpoint neutral. 218 Several
lower courts have similarly held that selective sign regulation is subject only to a viewpoint neutrality requirement, 2 19 thus permitting
wide latitude in structuring sign and billboard ordinances.
Despite these occasional sentiments, the Supreme Court has firmly
established that the content-neutrality requirement extends to subject-matter as well as viewpoint distinctions. 2 2 0 At the same time,
however, the Court has not clearly established the parameters of the
content-neutrality requirement as applied to subject-matter restrictions. Both the Court and commentators have noted that subject-matter distinctions do not pose as great a danger to First Amendment
values as viewpoint discrimination. 2 21 For this reason the Court has
permitted subject-matter distinctions in special circumstances, such
2 23
as where there is a captive audience, 22 2 or in a nonpublic forum.
More significantly, the Court has suggested that content-distinctions
basis, such
are valid where they can be justified on a content-neutral
24
as where distinct secondary effects can be shown.2
The uncertainties and tensions surrounding content-based distinctions are perhaps nowhere else more apparent than with regard to
selective limitations on signs and billboards. Although content-neutral restrictions provide some means for accommodating speech and
218. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 541-42 (1981)(Stevens,
J., dissenting in part); id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
219. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992)(stressing
viewpoint neutrality); Gannett Outdoor Co. v. City of Troy, 401 N.W.2d 335
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986). See also MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, LAND USE CON'rOLs

220.

221.

222.
223.

224.

664-65 (suggesting that it is unclear whether only viewpoint neutrality is
required).
The Court first extended content-neutrality to subject-matter distinctions in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972), where it stated that "government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." It has since affirmed on a number of occasions that the content-neutrality requirement extends to subject-matter as well as viewpoint
distinctions. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988)(O'Connor, J.)(viewpoint bias presents
"potential First Amendment ramifications of its own."); Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727, 735
(1980); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictionsof Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81 (1978).
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)(upholding ordinance
which allowed commercial but prohibited political advertising on public
transportation).
See Cornelius v. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985)(government charitable donation campaign); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 379 (1983)(internal school mailboxes); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976)(military base).
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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aesthetic interests, ordinances frequently include content related restrictions. This has led to not only differing views on the Court itself,2 2 5 but also a growing body of conflicting lower court decisions.
This section will address the problem of selective billboard and
sign regulations, focusing on three general types of content distinctions frequently found in sign ordinances: (1) commercial/non-commercial speech distinctions; (2) on-site/off-site distinctions; and (3)
special prohibitions and exemptions for particular speech contents.

A. Commercial/Non-commercial Distinctions
A frequent and important component of sign and billboard ordinances is distinct treatment of commercial and non-commercial
speech, with ordinances typically imposing more severe restrictions on
commercial speech.22 6 The basis for this distinction comes from Metromedia, where the Court upheld restrictions as applied to commercial speech but struck the restrictions down as applied to noncommercial speech. Although the decision itself was greatly divided
and confusing in most respects, a majority of the Justices appeared to
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech, permit2 27
ting greater restrictions on the former.
This commercial/non-commercial distinction is developed in the
plurality opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, where it evaluated the
ordinance's impact on each type of speech separately. 228 In doing so it
emphasized that the Court had consistently distinguished between
the level of protection afforded the two types of speech and that commercial speech was afforded lesser protection. 2 29 It then applied the
Central Hudson test to uphold the regulation of commercial speech
under the ordinance, which permitted on-site but prohibited off-site
225. See supra text section II.B, for a discussion of the widely varying views in Metromedia regarding the validity of content distinctions.
226. See, e.g., Major Media for the Southeast v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446,
1448 (E.D.N.C. 1985)(sign ordinance specifies it does not apply to non-commercial
speech); Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormand Beach, 415 So.
2d 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(prohibits commercial speech); City of Cottage
Grove v. Ott, 395 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)(ordinance interpreted to
regulate only commercial speech); R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294
S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)(ordinance restricts only commercial speech);
Singer Supermarkets v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 443 A.2d 1082, 1084 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)(interprets ordinance as only applying to commercial
speech). But see Bond, supra note 20, at 2514-20 (criticizing commercial/noncommercial distinction as not adequately protecting aesthetic concerns and possibly ignoring unique needs of certain commercial messages).
227. See supra note 110.

228. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504-12 (1981); id. at 541
(Stevens, J., concurring in part).
229. See id. at 504-507 (plurality opinion).
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the restrictions as applied to
commercial signs.23 0 The plurality found
23 1
non-commercial signs invalid, however.
Lower courts have read Metromediaas permitting different restrictions for commercial and non-commercial speech, and in particular
permitting local governments at a minimurn to ban off-site commercial
billboards.232 Indeed, some courts have interpreted sign ordinances
as applying only to commercial speech in order to avoid possible constitutional problems. 233 Although this would appear to give only limited guidance to local governments, what it does give is significant,
since off-site commercial billboards undoubtedly pose the greatest aesthetic concern to a community. For this reason, distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial signs has become an
courts consistently apimportant component of sign ordinances,23with
4
proving various forms of this regulation.
The validity of applying different standards to commercial and
non-commercial speech was recently brought into question, however,
in City of Cincinnativ. DiscoveryNetwork, Inc.,235 where the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited commercial but permitted non-commercial news racks. Although there was no showing
that the commercial news racks presented any greater aesthetic concern than non-commercial news racks and indeed comprised only a
small percentage of the total number, the city attempted to justify the
restriction because of36the lower First Amendment protection afforded
commercial speech.2
The Court found the regulation unconstitutional because it failed
to establish a reasonable fit under Central Hudson between the asserted interests of aesthetics and traffic safety and the selective prohibition of commercial news racks.2 3 7 In particular, the Court rejected
the argument that the commercial/non-commercial distinction, standing alone, was a valid basis for regulation where the distinction bore
no relationship to the interest asserted. 23 8 The Court acknowledged
that commercial speech is typically subject to greater regulation be230. See id. at 512 (plurality opinion).
231. See id. at 512-17 (plurality opinion).
232. See, e.g., Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1993).
Major Media for the Southeast v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446, 1448
(E.D.N.C. 1985).

233. See City of Cottage Grove v. Ott, 395 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
234. See, e.g., Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1993);
Major Media for the Southeast v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446, 1448
(E.D.N.C. 1985); City of Cottage Grove v. Ott, 395 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); Singer Supermarkets v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 443 A.2d 1082,
1089 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
235. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
236. Id. at 1516.
237. Id. at 1510.
238. Id. at 1516.
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cause the veracity of its content can be assessed, unlike non-commercial speech. Where that is not at issue, however, the Court's analysis
seemed to suggest that the state could not assert the "low value" of
restrictions on comcommercial speech as a basis to impose 2greater
39
mercial than on non-commercial speech.
In an important footnote the Court distinguished Metromedia,
which had been heavily relied upon by both the city and three dissenting Justices in Discovery to justify the distinct treatment of commercial and non-commercial speech found in the ordinance. 24 0 The
majority noted that in Metromedia the ordinance itself did not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech, but rather between on-site and off-site commercial billboards. As a result, the
majority did not read Metromedia as saying that a city could distin24

guish between commercial and non-commercial off-site billboards, '
as asserted in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Discovery dissent.242 The
majority apparently believed that such a distinction would in fact be
wrong, which, as noted above, has become a common one in sign and
billboard regulations.
As a practical matter, the Discovery majority interpretation of Metromedia is inaccurate. Although the Court is correct in asserting that
the ordinance there did not itself involve a commercial/non-commercial distinction, both the Metromedia plurality's reasoning, joined by
Justice Stevens, and the Metromedia result strongly indicate that municipalities can distinguish between commercial and non-commercial
speech. First, the plurality's entire discussion was structured around
the ordinance's distinct impact on commercial and non-commercial
speech and emphasized in several places the lower protection afforded
commercial speech.2 43 Since there was no question about the accuracy of the commercial speech in Metromedia,244 the plurality clearly
considered that even accurate commercial speech deserved less protection, and was thus a legitimate basis for regulatory distinction. Second, by upholding the ordinance as applied to off-site commercial
billboards, but finding it invalid as applied to off-site non-commercial
billboards, the plurality's analysis implicitly endorsed the commercial/
non-commercial distinction as applied to off-site billboards.
This interpretation of Metromedia would also appear consistent
with the Court's general assessment of commercial speech claims
where it has often noted the lower First Amendment value of commerId. at 1515-16.
Id. at 1514 n.20.
Id.
Id. at 1521-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504-12 (1981)(plurality
opinion).
244. See id. at 507 (plurality opinion).
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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cial speech.245 In doing so, the Court has at times offered a variety of
reasons for its lesser protection, including its more durable nature
based on its economic self-interest,246 its status as less central to the
primary interests of the First Amendment,247 and the concern that
conferring equal status on commercial speech will erode protection for
non-commercial speech.248 All three of these rationales, and the last
one in particular, suggest the reasonableness of distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech within a regulatory
scheme.
The decision in Discovery, therefore, presents a possible change in
commercial speech jurisprudence, and arguably limits municipalities'
abilities to structure commercial sign regulations approved by the
Court in Metromedia. The Court emphasized in Discovery, however,
that its holding was "narrow" and that under other circumstances and
facts differential treatment of commercial and non-commercial speech
might be justified.249 On this basis it might be argued that Discovery
should be limited to its facts, which involved a situation where the
amount of commercial speech regulated was so small compared to permitted speech that it did not advance the asserted state interest.
Indeed, in holding as it did, the Court in Discovery emphasized
that any benefit from the regulation was "minimal" and "paltry" because commercial news racks comprised only a small percentage of the
total.250 For this reason there was no reasonable fit between the asserted interests in aesthetics and traffic safety and the restriction. In
fact, this lack of a reasonable fit formed the principal basis for the
decision.251 The discussion of the commercial/non-commercial distinction was in response to the city's argument that the commercial/noncommercial distinction, standing alone, could justify the restriction.25 2
This more limited reading of Discovery would be consistent with
Metromedia and subsequent lower court decisions recognizing the
commercial/non-commercial distinction. Under this construction, municipalities could place greater restrictions on commercial than noncommercial speech, even where they present comparable aesthetic
245. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).

246. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 n.6 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
247. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5
(1985)(Powell, J.).
248. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
249. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993).
250. Id. at 1510 (quoting district court and court of appeals). The ordinance would
result in the removal of 62 commercial newsracks, while about 1,500-2,000 noncommercial newsracks would remain in place. Id.
251. Id. at 1510, 1516.
252. Id. at 1514-16.
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concerns, if such a restriction would in fact advance the asserted state
interest. Where the restriction is so minimal as to have no discernible
effect on the asserted interest, as in Discovery, it would be invalid,
since it would fail to directly advance the state interest as required
under Central Hudson.253
Admittedly, this interpretation is not consistent with the broader
tone of the opinion and its interpretation of Metromedia. On this
broader level, Discovery would preclude imposing greater restrictions
on commercial than non-commercial speech merely on the basis of the
lower value of commercial speech. Instead, any distinction must be
premised on showing that commercial signs and billboards pose a
greater threat to the asserted state interest in aesthetics and traffic
safety. In most instances this would be hard to show, since for all
practical purposes commercial signs pose the same problems as noncommercial signs.2 54
B. On-site/Off-site Distinction
A second and very common form of content distinction is between
on-site and off-site signs, with ordinances commonly permitting the
former and restricting the later.255 Although not an obvious form of

content distinction, the regulation in fact turns on the content of the
message, i.e., whether it relates to activities on the property or not,
and thus is technically content-based.256 As a practical matter, however, it does not pose the more serious concerns often associated with
content regulations.257
An initial inquiry, of course, is whether a restriction on off-site
signs is invalid because it restricts "too much" speech. Since an offsite sign might well be used to express the opinions of the property
owner, it arguably has locational significance because it identifies the
speaker. As suggested in Part IV of this Article, some accommodation
should normally be required of such signs.
253. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980).
254. As noted by the Court in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466

U.S. 789, 808 (1984), the aesthetic and traffic harms come from the sign itself.
Since commercial and non-commercial signs are comparable in appearance, there
would be no basis for a distinction.
255. See, eg,Messer v. City ofDouglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992); Wheeler v.
Comm'r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987); Burkhart Advertising, Inc. v.
City of Auburn, 786 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d
1378 (Conn. 1989).
256. See Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. 1989).
257. Since the distinction does not turn on a specific viewpoint or even subject-matter,
it is very unlikely that the government would use it to control speech or that it
would distort public debate.
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Analyzing the validity of the on-site/off-site distinction is still important for two reasons, however. First, of course, is that a court
might not recognize a protected right to display off-site signs, since
they are distinguishable in important respects from the residential
signs protected in Ladue. Second, even if some right to display off-site
signs is recognized, however, that does not mean they can be displayed
in the same manner as on-site signs. Any required accommodation of
off-site signs to display the views of a property owner would be rather
modest, most likely comparable to the types of signs allowed for use by
homeowners. Conversely, permissible on-site signs are usually larger
and more substantial in nature. Thus, even where accommodation of
off-site signs is required, an ordinance might well place greater restrictions on the off-site sign.
The on-site/off-site distinction was approved by a majority of the
Court in Metromedia, at least as applied to commercial signs. 258 In
that case the San Diego ordinance prohibited off-site commercial
signs, but permitted on-site commercial signs which identified the activity on the premises. Although the ordinance was thus underinclusive in that it only partially advanced the asserted interests, the
Metromedia plurality held that the distinction was valid for several
reasons. Among them was the recognition that even if underinclusive,
the ban on off-site billboards would still advance the state's aesthetic
and traffic interests. Further, the plurality stated that San Diego
could choose to value one type of commercial speech-on-site signsmore than another type-off-site signs. In particular, it was reasonable for the city to conclude that a commercial enterprise had a
stronger interest in identifying a place of business than in advertising
elsewhere.259
Although upholding the on-site/off-site distinction for commercial
speech, the plurality interpreted the exception for on-site signs to apply only to commercial signs. This meant that the ordinance permitted on-site commercial signs, but prohibited on-site non-commercial
signs, an inversion of First Amendment principles that was unconstitutional.260 The plurality's interpretation of the ordinance is questionable, however, since the ordinance can be read to permit a noncommercial activity to have an on-site identification sign; the only
clear prohibition was for off-site signs, i.e., those which did not relate
258. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981)(plurality
opinion); id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). The reasoning behind
Chief Justice Burger's and then Justice Rehnquist's dissents indicates that they
also approved of the distinction. See id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 511-12 (plurality opinion).
260. See id. at 513 (plurality opinion).
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to activities on the premises. 26 1 Nevertheless, under the plurality's
interpretation the ordinance would be invalid.
Although lower courts have generally upheld distinctions between
on-site and off-site commercial signs, a significant split of authority
has arisen with regard to the distinction as applied to non-commercial
signs. At issue is whether an ordinance which limits on-site
messages-whether commercial or non-commercial-to activities associated with the premises discriminates against non-commercial
speech.262 For example, such an ordinance would permit non-commercial activities, such as hospitals and political organizations, to
have on-site identification signs. However, neither commercial or noncommercial uses could have non-commercial messages unrelated to
the activity conducted on the premises. 26 s
The problem with the above ordinance is that the permissibility of
a message potentially turns on its content. In particular, the owner of
a commercial establishment would be prohibited from displaying a
non-commercial message unrelated to the premises. Thus, a fast food
restaurant could advertise its product, but could not have a sign such
as "Save the Whales," "Get Out of the U.N.," or supporting a particular political candidate. This arguably runs afoul of the plurality's
analysis in Metromedia, where it said:
In-so-far as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their
content to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected
with a particular site
is of greater value than the communication of non-com2 64
mercial messages.

In other words, once a decision is made to permit a sign at a particular
location, the government cannot dictate what it says.
A number of municipalities have responded to this perceived problem by including "substitution clauses" which provide that any on-site
sign authorized under an ordinance may instead contain an off-site,
261. The on-site exception in Metromedia allowed "signs designating the name of the
owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed." Id. at 493 n.1
(plurality opinion). Justice Brennan interpreted this exemption as applying
equally to non-commercial speech, stating "[i]f the occupant is an enterprise usually associated with non-commercial speech, the substance of the identifying sign
would be non-commercial." Id. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring).
262. See Bond, supra note 20, at 2482, 2500-07 (stating that this is the primary issue
facing courts after Metromedia and discussing the judicial split regarding the
issue).
263. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Comm'r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987); Burns v.
Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. 1989).
264. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981)(plurality
opinion).
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non-commercial message in lieu of the permitted on-site message. 2 6 5
Thus, there is no discrimination under the ordinance since once a
property owner qualifies to have an on-site sign, that owner can
choose any other message instead. Such substitution clauses also do
not interfere with a city's effort to advance aesthetic and traffic safety
concerns, since messages are in lieu of, not in addition to, permitted
signs.
Courts are split regarding whether an ordinance restricting signs
to activities located on the premises violates the First Amendment absent a substitution clause. Several courts have struck down such ordinances, stating that they violated the content-neutrality requirement
by limiting what the property owner could say.2 66 Several other
courts, in upholding ordinances which included substitution clauses,
strongly suggested that the ordinance would have been invalid with2 67
out the substitution clause.
An equal number of courts, however, have upheld provisions which
limited messages to those describing activities conducted on-site, even
absent a substitution clause.2 68 In so holding, those courts have emphasized that such ordinances treat commercial and non-commercial
speech the same; a non-commercial enterprise can display a sign relating to activities on the premises in the same way that a commercial
enterprise can. 26 9 Thus, the only real distinction that is drawn is
based on location and only indirectly touches on content.
This latter position would seem to be the better one for two reasons. First, although the on-site/off-site distinction involves a form of
content regulation, it is attenuated at best. The ordinance itself treats
all content the same, with any content distinctions turning on the nature of the activity at the particular site. In such a situation the nor265. See, e.g., Revere Nat'l Corp. v. Prince George's County, 819 F. Supp. 1336, 1339
(D. Md. 1993); City of Salinas v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising Inc., 234 Cal. Rptr.
619, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
266. See Burkhart Advertising, Inc. v. Auburn, 786 F. Supp. 721, 732 (N.D. Ind. 1991);
National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 703 F. Supp. 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1989);
Metromedia v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982).
267. See Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 1993); National
Advertising Co. v. Chicago, 788 F. Supp. 994, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1991); City of Salinas
v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 234 Cal. Rptr. 619, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
268. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1067 (3rd Cir. 1994); Messer v.
City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1992); Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 1987); National Advertising
Co. v. Chicago, 788 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Burns v. Barrett, 561
A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. 1989); City and County of San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor
Advertising, 237 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
269. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992); Burns v.
Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. 1989).
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mal concerns posed by content distinctions are barely implicated. 2 70
There is no fear of censorship or pretextual regulation,27 1 since the
distinction makes no reference to specific content. Similarly, such a
distinction would not distort public debate, 2 72 since it would not disproportionately affect any particular topic or subject-matter.
Second, the unique and essential role that on-site signs play in
identifying activities distinguishes them from off-site signs and justi-

fies distinct treatment. There is little doubt that on-site signs lack
adequate alternatives to a much greater extent than do off-site
messages. The Court's special solicitude for expressive activities that
lack adequate alternatives2 7 S suggests that municipalities should be
able to accommodate signs that lack adequate alternatives. Further,
the lack of adequate alternatives for on-site signs provides a contentneutral reference point for regulation, which takes it outside the con2 74
tent-based analysis.
C. Exemptions and Prohibitions

The last and most problematic form of content distinction are ordinances which either specifically prohibit or exempt non-commercial
signs based on their content. The most common of these are ordinances which generally prohibit signs or billboards in certain areas,
subject to various content-based exemptions. 2 75 Although there may
be a variety of reasons for this, including the perceived relative values
of the particular speech, these distinctions often are attempts to ac270. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 Wns &
MARY L. REv. 189, 200-33 (1983)(suggesting four possible reasons for stringent
review of content-based restrictions: (1) the desire for equal treatment of speech
content; (2) recognition that speech cannot be restricted because of its communicative impact (ie., how people will react to it); (3) distortion of public debate; (4)
improper motivation (i.e., the government cannot prohibit speech because it disapproves of the speaker's ideas)).
271. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980)("[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action
must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been
prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.' ").
272. Id. at 538 ("To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public
debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political
truth."). See also Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1062 (3rd. Cir.
1994)(content distinctions might distort public debate).
273. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
274. See City ofRenton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See also Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)(O'Connor, J.)(discussing "secondary effects"
analysis).
275. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3rd Cir. 1994); Goward v.
City of Minneapolis, 456 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); City of Lakewood v.
Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1981).
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commodate the particular needs of certain speech without altogether
losing the benefits of regulation. Thus, where a town would like to
generally ban signs, but recognizes a unique need for certain signs, it
frequently chooses to exempt a few signs rather than opt for the "all or
nothing" approach that strict content-neutrality would require.
Despite the obvious appeal of such ordinances, by drawing distinctions based on non-commercial content they touch upon core First
Amendment concerns. The Supreme Court has increasingly held such
content-based regulations invalid, making it in recent years the
Court's primary analytical tool.276 At the same time the Court has
indicated that special circumstances might justify limited forms of
subject-matter distinctions, 2 77 providing some ambiguity in what is
often considered a clear-cut area of First Amendment jurisprudence.
This ambiguity is perhaps no more apparent than with respect to
sign and billboard ordinances. As noted in Part IlI, the plurality in
Metromedia emphasized the need for strict content-neutrality when it
held not only that the ordinance's perceived preference for commercial
over non-commercial speech was invalid, but also that the various
non-commercial speech exemptions were invalid.27s However, the
other five Justices in Metromedia would not have ruled out some content distinctions. The three dissenting Justices apparently would allow any subject-matter distinctions, prohibiting only viewpoint
distinctions.279 Justices Brennan and Blackmun, however, suggested
a tighter standard, stating that they would permit subject-matter exemptions only in narrowly drawn circumstances. 280
This tension regarding subject-matter distinctions is also apparent
in Vincent, where the Court suggested two different standards regarding content-neutrality. At the beginning of the opinion the Court analyzed the ordinance under a viewpoint neutrality standard, suggesting
a mode of analysis similar to the Metromedia dissents.2s1 Later in the
opinion, however, the Court rejected an argument that an exemption
should be provided for political signs, noting that such an exemption
276. See, e.g., Boss v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988)(O'Connor, J.); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Stone, supra note 270, at 189; Williams, supra
note 13, at 616-17.
277. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See generally Farber, supra note 221, at 727-31; Stone, supra note 221.
278. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-17 (1981)(plurality
opinion).
279. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
281. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). Several courts and commentators have interpreted Vincent as requiring only viewpoint neutrality. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th
Cir. 1992); Gannett Outdoor Co. v. City of Troy, 401 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); DANIL R. MANDELKF, LAND US E LAW § 11.15 (2nd ed. 1988).
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might violate content-neutrality absent a showing of unique need. 28 2

The Court proceeded to undercut this more rigorous standard, however, by acknowledging that the ordinance contained
two exemptions
2 3
for government signs, which it declined to review. S
Similarly, lower court decisions reflect the tensions inherent in reviewing content-based sign exemptions and prohibitions. Courts often
state that any exemptions violate the First Amendment requirement
of content-neutrality,284 usually citing to the plurality opinion in Me-

tromedia.285 Conversely, several decisions have held or stated that
the First Amendment permits some limited forms of exemptions.
Although generally adhering to the requirements of content-neutrality, these courts have emphasized the necessity of allowing some minor exemptions where they can be justified apart from their content,
such as where a relationship exists between sign content and a specific
location.28 6
The tension in these cases flow from the dilemma local governments face when trying to structure a truly content-neutral ordinance.
Although there might be strong aesthetic and traffic interests supporting sign limitations, there are almost always some limited categories
of signs which are deemed desirable to have, such as directional signs,
speed signs, construction signs, and government signs. Strict contentneutrality requires an "all or nothing" approach, however, because
once an exemption is created for one sign all others must also be allowed. This puts local governments in the difficult position of foregoing either the aesthetic and traffic safety concerns behind a general
ban, or the important
interests served by a limited number of uniquely
87
valuable signs.2
The Supreme Court has indicated that although most content distinctions will be invalid, a limited basis for distinctions exists when
they can be justified on content-neutral terms. This "content-neutral"
grounds analysis was developed primarily in City of Renton v. Play282. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815-16 (1984).
283. Id. at 817 n.34.
284. See, eg., National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 557 (2nd
Cir. 1990); Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993); Revere
Nat'l Corp. v. Prince George's County, 819 F. Supp. 1336 (D. Md. 1993).
285. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 557 (2nd
Cir. 1990); Jackson v. City Council of Charlottesville, 659 F. Supp. 470,473 (W.D.
Va. 1987).
286. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3rd Cir. 1994); City of Lakewood
v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1981). See also Gannett Outdoor
Co. v. City of Troy, 401 N.W.2d 335, 340-42 nn.9 and 17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).

287. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, at 532 n.10 (1981)(Brennan,
J., concurring)(Noting that a local government might have some special goals furthered by limited exemptions, Justice Brennan stated, "It would make little sense
to say that a city has an all-or-nothing proposition-either ban all billboards or
none at all.").
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time Theaters, Inc.,288 where the Court held that distinct secondary
effects could justify different restrictions. In establishing this secondary effects analysis, the Court said that a regulation is content-neutral if it is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech." 28 9 Although the Court has not applied this outside the context of Renton, it has in recent cases cited the standard with approval,
suggesting its applicability to any type of speech.2 90 Moreover, in
striking down content distinctions the Court has noted on occasion
that the exempted speech was not unique, suggesting that if there
were unique circumstances, content-based distinctions might be
valid. 29 1
Two possible grounds for content-based sign distinctions exist on
this basis. The first is that discussed in Renton, where particular sign
contents would generate distinct secondary effects from other sign
messages. Thus, where particular sign subject-matter can be shown
to generate distinct secondary effects in terms of aesthetics or traffic
safety, a valid basis for regulation arguably exists.
As a practical matter, however, any distinct secondary effects accompanying signs would be hard to establish. The Court has indicated that any distinct secondary effects will need to be established by
clear evidence. The aesthetic and traffic concerns supporting sign regulation do not generally vary with content, however, since the signs
themselves pose the problem in question. 2 92 Occasional arguments
that particular signs have unique secondary effects, such as political
288. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
289. Id. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).

290. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992)(discussing "secondary effects" test). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)(stating that a regulation is content-neutral if justified without reference to the
speech); Williams, supra note 13, at 631-35 (analyzing how in recent years the
Court's primary meaning of content discrimination has become that reflected in
Renton).
291. For example, in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the Court struck down an
ordinance which prohibited residential picketing but exempted peaceful labor
picketing by people employed at the residence. In finding this exemption invalid,
the Court emphasized that there is "nothing inherent in the nature of peaceful
labor picketing that would make it any less disruptive ofresidential privacy than
peaceful picketing on issues of broader social concern." Id. at 465. The Court also
carefully examined the possibility that the exemption might be justified because
it was a form of speech "peculiarly appropriate to residential neighborhoods and
cannot effectively be exercised elsewhere." Id. at 468 n.13. It stated, however, that
there were other contents equally appropriate to residential neighborhoods and
therefore the exemption could not be justified on that basis. Id. See also Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984)(in rejecting exemption for campaign signs, Court emphasized that there was no
showing that "a uniquely important form of communication has been abridged for
the categories of expression engaged in.").
292. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
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signs being more likely to provoke drivers to drive on lawns to run
them over, have been properly rejected by courts. 2 93 As a general
matter the harm comes from the sign itself, thus making it very difficult to show distinct secondary effects.
One plausible argument that has been made to show distinct secondary effects is that certain signs are more likely to proliferate because they are not limited in nature and thus quantitatively have
distinct secondary effects. For example, in Ladue the city attempted
to justify content distinctions by arguing that signs banned under the
ordinance, such as political signs, are prone to "proliferate," while permitted signs, such as residence identification signs and "for sale"
signs, are naturally limited in number. 2 94 Therefore, although the
qualitative secondary effects from any particular sign are the same,
quantitatively they would differ.
Because the Supreme Court in Ladue held that residential signs
were uniquely important means of communication and could not be
prohibited, it did not address the secondary effects argument. To the
extent that evidence is offered which would establish such effects, the
argument may have some validity. The problem, however, is that a
numerical limitation on signs that tend to proliferate would be an
equally effective and less intrusive means of regulation. 2 95 Like most
other secondary effects arguments seeking to justify content distinctions in sign ordinances, it should therefore be rejected.
A second and more likely ground on which to justify content distinctions is the unique need and lack of alternatives for certain sign
content, in particular those that have a unique relationship with the
property. 2 96 As is true with the secondary effects analysis, a showing
of unique need provides a content-neutral reference on which to justify
a distinction. Such an approach would appear to be implicit under the
secondary effects analysis, since the distinction is made by reference
to a content-neutral basis, for example the unique relationship of the
297
sign to the property.
293. City of Euclid v. Mabel, 484 N.E.2d 249, 254-55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
294. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043-44 (1994). Residence identification
signs and "for sale" signs are naturally limited in number because you only need
one to accomplish their purpose. In contrast, political signs are not so naturally
limited, since there might be numerous candidates or causes that a person
supports.
295. A numerical limitation would be an effective way to address the distinct secondary effect of proliferation. A numerical limitation on certain signs, such as residential signs, might well restrict "too much" speech, however, and therefore be
invalid. The Court in Ladue made clear that even if a restriction was justified by
distinct secondary effects, it must still provide adequate alternatives to be valid.
Id. at 2044 n.11.
296. See Bond, supra note 20, at 2520-22.

297. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 468 n.13 (1980)(suggesting that unique
need might be a basis for an exemption).
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The Court's decisions in Vincent and Metromedia also suggest the
possibility of limited exemptions based on unique need. In Vincent the
Court rejected an argument that the ordinance could have been more
narrowly drawn by exempting political campaign signs, stating that
such an exemption was not required and indeed might itself violate
content-neutrality. 2 98 In reaching this conclusion it emphasized that
there had been no finding that campaign signs do not generate the
same concerns as other signs, or that "a uniquely important form of
communication has been abridged for the categories of expression engaged in" by the plaintiff.2 99 This suggests a special exemption might
have been permitted where signs serve a unique function for the
speech in question.
A majority of the Justices in Metromedia also indicated that some
exemptions might be valid. The three dissenting Justices would permit substantial exemptions as long as they were not viewpoint neutral,300 a position that is admittedly inconsistent with current
content-neutrality standards.01 Justice Brennan's concurrence,
joined by Justice Blackmun, proposed a much more narrow standard
in dictum, stating that if a municipality could justify a total ban, he
would allow an exception "if it directly furthers an interest that is at
least as important as the interest underlying the total ban, if the exception is no broader than necessary to advance the special goal, and if
the exception is narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible
on the overall goal."302

Both Vincent and Metromedia lend support, therefore, to the position that limited exemptions might be valid, a position consistent with
the broader "content-neutrality" analysis outlined in Renton. However, Justice Brennan's proposed approach, though sympathetic to the
competing concerns involved, is problematic because it permits cities
to exempt speech deemed important enough to outweigh the interests
supporting the general ban. This appears to invite cities to evaluate
303
the value of certain speech, an impermissible basis for regulation.
A more appropriate standard is suggested by the language in Vincent, where the Court asked whether the sign was "a uniquely important form of communication . . . for the categories of expression
298. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815-16 (1984).
299. Id. at 816.
300. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 541-42 (1981)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
301. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536-38
(1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980).
302. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 477 U.S. 530, 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
303. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1064 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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engaged in." 30 4 A more precise version of this standard was recently
pronounced by the Third Circuit in Rappa v. New Castle County,305
where it stated that an exemption was justified where there is a significant relationship between the content of particular speech and a
specific location.30 6 A sign serves a uniquely important means of communication in such a situation for which there are often no adequate
alternatives. For example, directional signs, speed limit signs, and
street addresses lack adequate alternatives; the signs are uniquely
important means of communicating the respective messages which
30 7
cannot be duplicated by other means.
The case for such exemptions is most compelling where courts have
recognized a constitutional right to display the sign because of a lack
of adequate alternatives. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that homeowners have a right to display "for sale" signs3 O8 and,
after Ladue, ideological lawn signs. 30 9 Thus, a city should be free to
exempt such signs without violating content-neutrality, contrary to
the plurality's analysis in Metromedia.3 ' 0 Any other result would put
cities in an impossible Catch-22.
Even where the sign might not be constitutionally compelled, as
with government direction signs or speed limit signs, exemptions
should be permitted based upon the unique relationship of the sign to
the property. Although in some instances such signs might be justified under strict scrutiny in any event, as a practical matter the sitespecific nature of the sign provides a content-neutral justification for
an exemption. It makes little sense to require municipalities to take
an "all or nothing" approach in such cases. Moreover, limited exemptions of this type pose little threat to the concerns supporting content
neutrality. In particular, the requirement that the speech relate to
the property provides a nonspeech reference point, thus avoiding
problems of improper motive or censorship.S1 Further, public debate
304. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984).

305. 18 F.3d 1043 (3rd Cir. 1994).
306. Id. at 1065. See also Bond, supra note 20, at 2520-24 (arguing that government
can draw content distinctions based on identifying/nonidentifying function of a
sign).
307.
308.
309.
310.

Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1063, 1064 (3rd Cir. 1994).
See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
Included among the exemptions in Metromedia were "for sale" signs and temporary political signs. Courts had previously required some accommodation of both
signs because of their unique nature. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)("for sale" signs); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d
1360 (9th Cir. 1976)(temporary political signs). Despite this required accommodation, the plurality in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego indicated an exemp-

tion of such signs would violate content-neutrality.
311. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). See
also Stone, supra note 270, at 227-33.
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is not distorted; rather, by exempting signs with no or inferior alterna2
tives debate is equalized.3 1
Beyond these limited exceptions, however, most other forms of content-based distinctions should be invalid, a result usually reached by
lower courts. Particularly problematic would be ordinances which selectively prohibit some speech content while permitting most other
signs. As noted earlier it would be very difficult to establish distinct
secondary effects for particular sign contents. Further, such a regulatory scheme could not be justified by site dependent considerations,
since it would inevitably include numerous signs that would not meet
that test. Thus, attempts to selectively prohibit certain content
should be and have been struck down by courts.3 1 3
One final and particularly problematic type of content-based distinction commonly found in ordinances are durational limits on certain signs, most notably political campaign signs.3 1 4 Ordinances will
often limit the number of days campaign signs can be displayed prior
to an election and require that they be removed within a certain time
after the election. 3 15 On their face such restrictions appear quite reasonable. They are narrowly drawn restrictions designed to accommodate speech interests when most significant, and yet still further
aesthetic and traffic safety concerns. As such, they reflect a careful
calibration of the competing interests involved in sign regulation.
There are two significant concerns raised by durational limits,
however. First, limits on campaign signs potentially restrict "too
much" speech by prohibiting campaign related speech during certain
periods.316 Although limits might seem appropriate because the
speech concerns an event set in time, the utility of the speech is not
necessarily so limited. Not only might significant time be needed to
persuade, but more fundamentally campaign signs are a way to communicate a person's own beliefs and philosophy by allegiance to a particular candidate. This purpose is not limited in time prior to an
election.
312. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1064 (3rd Cir. 1994).
313. See Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972)(political signs); City of Euclid
v. Mabel, 484 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)(political signs).
314. See, e.g., City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52,
54-5 (N.D. Cal. 1982)(limited to 60 days before election); Orazio v. Town of North
Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Temple Baptist Church v. City of
Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982); Van v. Travel Info. Council, 628 P.2d
1217 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). See also Blumoff, supra note 80, at 194-96 (discussing
durational requirements).
315. See, e.g., City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52,
54-5 (N.D. Cal. 1982)(60 day pre-election limit and removal within 14 days).
316. Id. at 59-60. See also Van v. Travel Info. Council, 628 P.2d 1217, 1226 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981).
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Second, durational limitations on campaign signs possibly violate
content-neutrality by imposing restrictions on campaign signs that
are not imposed on other sign contents. This is particularly true
where the limit is only on campaign signs and not part of a broader
durational limit on all time-related events. In such an instance, specific limits on campaign signs discriminate on the basis of content
without a content-neutral justification and would be invalid.317
Durational limits on campaign signs might not violate contentneutrality, however, where they are part of a broad limit on all timerelated events, such as advertising a sale, musical performance, theater showing or special meeting.31 8 In such a case the time reference of
the various contents might serve as a content-neutral reference point.
As noted above, however, a durational restriction on campaign signs
might still restrict "too much" speech.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Local efforts at sign and billboard regulation present cities with
the difficult task of furthering aesthetic and traffic safety goals while
accommodating First Amendment rights. In doing so they must avoid
the two problems identified in City ofLadue v. Gilleo: restricting "too
much" speech and restricting "too little." As evidenced by a large and
often conflicting body of caselaw in recent years, this is no easy task.
Ladue itself suggests that cities must be most concerned about restricting "too much" speech when regulating signs attendant to private property ownership. Although this concern is strongest
regarding residential signs, it also exists to varying degrees with onsite signs and off-site nonresidential signs used to express the views of
a property owner. Conversely, signs used in their role as a medium for
third parties are deserving of less protection. Even broad restrictions
on a category of signs, such as billboards, should be valid as long as
the city's aesthetic interest is appreciably advanced.
Problems of regulating "too little" speech come in two forms.
Although some courts have struck down content-neutral restrictions
on portable signs as being underinclusive, both Metromedia and Vincent indicate that cities should have substantial freedom in structuring content-neutral underinclusive regulations as long as they
advance the asserted interests. Cities have far less freedom with regard to content-based distinctions, however. Content distinctions
should be permitted where they can be justified on a content-neutral
basis, in particular where the sign is specially related to the property.
317. City of Antioch v. Candidates Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52, 57-58
(N.D. Cal. 1981).
318. Id. at 58 (violates content-neutrality by placing time limits on political campaign
signs but not on signs for "upcoming commercial, charitable or civic events").
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Other than this limited exception, content-based distinctions should
be invalid.

